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Revived Weimar-era "radical conservatism" and fresh "New Right" 
and "paleoconservative" theories offer a radical cultural critique of 
global capitalism and liberal democracy. Expressing a broader re-
tribalization and perceived failure of modernization, their defense 
of communal particularity attacks the multicultural nation-state, 
liberal rights, and universal citizenship. This essay links reactionary 
tribalism to a recurrent 20th-century theoretical tendency, the "total 
critique of m odernity"—a fusion of oversimplified Nietzschean and 
Weberian ideas. Historically, total critique has promoted conver­
gence between right and left, such as the current overlapping facets 
of "radical conservatism" and "strong-program postmodernism." To­
tal critique counters the "historicist" method of "internal critique" 
and the "communication model" characteristic of reflexive social 
theory. The discussion uncovers the mediating role of social theory 
in the problematic relationship of science and partially disenchanted 
public spheres in plural, democratic cultures. 
THEORIZING SOCIOCULTURAL RUPTURE: SOCIAL THEORY AND 
MODERNITY 
Not ideas, but material and ideal interests directly govern . . . 
conduct. Yet very frequently the "world images" . . . created 
by "ideas" have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along 
which action has been pushed by the dynamics of interest. (Max 
Weber [1922-23] 1958c, p. 280) 
At the end of "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," Max 
Weber ([1904] 1949a, p. 112), perhaps reflecting on the roots of his own 
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excursion into the philosophy of social science, declared that "when the 
atmosphere changes . . . and the road is lost in the twilight" new stand­
points are sought "from the heights of thought." He was speaking of 
moments of sociocultural rupture, which undermine the efficacy and le­
gitimacy of established ways of doing and knowing. At these times, he 
implied, the background understandings of everyday practice and estab­
lished institutions, including science, become visible and contestable; the 
tacit "value-ideas" that define certain types of knowledge as "worth know­
ing" and, thereby, shape science's directions shed their taken-for-grant-
edness and are subject to reflection, criticism, and debate. Weber and 
other first-generation modern theorists addressed an epochal transfor­
mation generated by capitalist development—that is, the rise of mecha­
nized industry, the bureaucratic state, and urban mass culture. As Marx 
and Engels asserted famously, they faced a condition where "all that is 
solid melts into air" {[1848] 1976, p. 487). Modern theorists' "historicist" 
theorizing fit the emergent secular worldview, posing normative stand­
points and framing arguments about the "value" of divergent develop­
mental trajectories on the basis of sociological conditions and conse­
quences. Their fresh world images later contributed to fateful shifts of 
the sociocultural and political "tracks." 
Modern theories gave impetus to new social movements and fresh policy 
regimes as well as to antimodern countercurrents. Competing with other 
visions, including hegemonic ones, their impacts were not immediate. 
Many of the theories were ignored, but some were later taken up by 
specific strata, movements, and parties. During the World War I era and 
the hard times that followed, the new theories' divergent directions crys­
tallized into fresh versions of right and left and had significant human 
consequences (Hughes 1977; Kloppenberg 1986; Lepenies 1988). Karl 
Mannheim held that these normatively oriented approaches often posed 
"utopian" visions, expressing "premature truths" that "transcend" and 
threaten to "shatter" the sociocultural orders in which they are nestled. 
Although starting as "wish fantasies" of individual "forerunners," he ar­
gued, they are sometimes made "effective" or are translated into "political 
aims" by specific carrier strata and popularized by "ascendent" groups.2 
In his view, however, the strata and groups that transform Utopias into 
realities are not known with any certainty until after they have had sub­
stantial impact. To study potentially effective or emergent Utopias, Mann­
2 Speaking of the bourgeois idea of "freedom," Mannheim asserted that "it was in part 
a real Utopia, i.e., it contained elements oriented towards the realization of a new social 
order which were instrumental in disintegrating the previously existing order and 
which, after their realization, did in part become translated into reality" ([1936] 1955, 
p. 203). 
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heim implied, requires analysis of how well they engage "currents already 
present in society" (i.e., imminent changes, crises, conflicts, movements) 
that open hegemonic views to challenge (1955, pp. 193-94, 203-5). 
The types of theory capable of representing Weberian world images or 
Mannheimian Utopias were later eschewed by post-World War II soci­
ologists as "armchair philosophies," too broad for empirical testing, and, 
more recently, by postmodernists as retrograde "grand narratives," which 
"elide difference." But new approaches, reminiscent in breadth and nor-
mativity to first-generation modern theories, have reemerged in interdis­
ciplinary and transdisciplinary spaces and have generated intense public 
debates as well as sharp splits within specialized disciplines, including 
sociology. Similar to the earlier theories, the new ones occupy space be­
tween science and philosophy. Their sweeping historical and epistemo-
logical discourses debate the normative directions or the "value" of dif­
ferent types of sociocultural life and knowledge. Although often employing 
scientific research findings and middle-range concepts, these theories go 
beyond "sociological theory" as strictly construed and are better conceived 
of as "social theory." As Donald N. Levine holds, social theory is a "meta-
scientific enterprise," arising from the long-standing concern with the 
"problem of modernity," posing "questions that science may not answer 
but which we feel compelled to pursue nevertheless," and providing a 
"secular" and "dialogical" alternative to absolutist or transcendental nor­
mative arguments (1995, pp. 306, 317-28; see also 1997). As implied by 
Levine, social theory "historicizes" normative issues, opening them to so­
ciologically informed public debates, which fit and nurture plural, dis­
enchanted democratic culture. However, social theory is still an emergent, 
incomplete project manifesting the ongoing reflexive, democratic side of 
Enlightenment thought. By contrast, my analysis of "reactionary tribal­
ism" probes an antihistoricist tradition, emphasizing reenchantment and 
dedemocratization. Grasping this theoretical and sociocultural alternative 
will help clarify the broader significance of modern theory and its en-
twinement with Enlightenment and democracy.3 
I explore how the European "New Right" and North American "pa-
leoconservatism" counter the sociological presuppositions of modern the­
ory, especially its keystone "communication model." Although still mar­
ginal to public life in most democracies, these approaches address critically 
neoliberal globalization and cultural postmodernization and engage cre­
atively widespread sensibilities about the perceived failure of post-World 
3 U nless otherwise specified, "modern democracy" refers to European-style social de­
mocracy as well as more market-centered liberal democracy. "Modern theory" refers 
to convergent facets of classical social theory and later theories that followed in their 
tracks (e.g., Antonio and Kellner 1992a, 1992b). 
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War II modernization. They also amplify powerful, key tendencies of 
resurgent neopopulist movements, cultural wars, and racial, ethnic, and 
religious conflicts. My main focus is on a recurrent 20th-century theoretical 
tendency, the "total critique of modernity," or a highly pessimistic fusion 
of one-sided Nietzscheanism and one-sided Weberianism that treats mod­
ern theory's hopes about social progress as moribund and portrays pro­
found exhaustion of modern democratic culture and institutions. It has 
animated theoretical convergences between the radical right and cultural 
left, and it appears again today in overlapping facets of "radical conser­
vatism" and "strong-program postmodernism." Total critique counters 
modern theorists' "historicist" and "dialogical" method of "internal cri­
tique" and their other core presuppositions. My exploration of the resur­
gent reactionary tribal alternative will help draw out the role of "social 
theory" (i.e., a distinct type of normatively oriented discourse anchored 
in "sociological argumentation") in the problematic relationship of science 
and partially disenchanted public spheres in plural, democratic cultures. 
Probing what is at stake in the revived debates over modernity and post-
modernity, I address the type of moment that Weber spoke of nearly a 
century ago—the ending of a historical conjuncture (i.e., the postwar era) 
when existing sociocultural ideas and practices are challenged. 
ENDINGS' DISCOURSES: FIN DE SlfcCLE SOCIAL THEORY 
We stand, I believe, with a clearing ahead of us. The exhaustion 
of Modernism, the aridity of communist life, the tedium of the 
unrestrained self, and the meaninglessness of the monolithic 
political chants, all indicate that a long era is coming to an 
end. (Daniel Bell)4 
Modern-democratic theories usually have been anchored in a "positive," 
"ethical" vision of modern culture and a historicist idea of "progress" that 
bridges the tension between normative ideals and actual social conditions 
(Mannheim 1955, pp. 219-29). From the start, modern theorists claimed 
that emergent sociocultural modernity and its immanent logics of devel­
opment forge new types of complex cooperation and communicative ca­
pacities that advance individual autonomy, social justice, and social par­
ticipation. These visions have, over time, grown more inclusive and 
multicultural. Modern theorists argue that sociocultural differentiation 
and rationalization, regardless of their repressive features, provide vital 
resources for overcoming traditional constraints, coping with modern pa­
thologies, and creating a more liberated or pacified future (Antonio and 
4 The passage is from Bell's 1978 foreword to Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, 
published originally in 1976 (for the quote, see Bell [1996, p. xxix]). 
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Kellner 1992a, 19926). Faith in progressive modernization has contributed 
to the legitimacy of modern societies and politics. Postwar modernization 
theories replayed this theme and were a core feature of sociocultural 
legitimation. However, more recent claims about the "end of history" 
challenge this faith and legitimacy. 
The quote at the head of this section illustrates the sense of profound 
exhaustion found in the endings' discourses that have became all the more 
pervasive after Bell's prescient critique of cultural postmodernity. In an­
other work, he sounded even more pessimistic: "All hopes have seemingly 
been betrayed. The Owl of Minerva which once flew at dusk has folded 
its wings, . . . the direction of History has been lost, and it knows not 
what to tell us" (1990, p. 43). Opening a now-classic essay, Fredric Jameson 
(19846, p. 53) equated postmodernism with "inverted millenarianism," 
stressing "the end of this or that (the end of ideology , art, or social class; 
the 'crisis' of Leninism, social democracy, or the welfare state, etc., etc.)." 
Converging with the culturally conservative Bell, the Marxist Jameson 
argued that extreme cultural fragmentation disorients people and prevents 
them from locating themselves in history, grasping its shape, posing nor­
mative stances toward it, and altering its directions. These diverse the­
orists imply an end of the sociocultural conditions and of types of sub­
jectivity that modern theorists, from Marx to Parsons, argued animated 
social progress. Later 20th-century theories of modernity have debated 
centrally the possible depletion of the historical resources that earlier 
modern theorists believed were arising from, guiding, and advancing pro­
gressively modernization. 
Posed at the moment that Soviet communism was collapsing and Chi­
nese communism was reeling, Francis Fukuyama's "end of history" thesis 
received widespread public attention and became the prime textual 
marker of the ending of the postwar era (1989, 1992). Fukuyama argued 
that the revolutions of 1989 opened a new posthistorical era of global 
neoliberalism, ending futile Utopian dreams and grand struggles in their 
name. He saw progressive-liberal welfarism, New Left politics, and so­
cialism as moribund and capitalism and the liberal state, shorn of their 
misguided egalitarian and socially engineered postwar excesses, to have 
triumphed decisively and globally: "There is no apparent or obvious way 
in which the future will represent a fundamental improvement over our 
current order" and no "realistic alternatives" to market liberalism (Fu­
kuyama 1992, pp. 51; 1999, p. 33). Left-leaning modern theorists and 
postmodernists alike attacked Fukuyama's neoconservative celebration 
of markets and minimalist mass democracy. But they, too, implied that 
there are "no alternatives." 
For example, the postmodernist Zygmunt Bauman spoke exuberantly 
about postmodernization's ridding us of postwar modernity's "false con­
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sciousness," rigid structuralism, social engineering, and state centeredness. 
A refugee from Polish communism, he applauded the prospect of a liberal 
epoch free from the state socialist "alternative." Like Fukuyama, he de­
scribed a shift to a more unrestricted market capitalism, but, acknowl­
edging an enormous split between affluent consumers and the margin­
alized poor, he saw this change as something less than an unqualified 
victory for democracy. However, on a deeper level, he agreed with Fu­
kuyama, declaring an end of the politics of redistribution (although con­
ceding that socioeconomic polarization and panoptical control of the poor 
were increasing). He embraced ambivalently "living without alternatives" 
or accepting the radically divided "two nations society," where relief from 
statism comes at the cost of social justice (Bauman 1992, pp. 93-113, 
175-204; 1993, pp. 240-44; see also Offe 1996, pp. vii-x, 4, 36, 54, n. 9, 
171-79). Thus, similar views about neoliberal hegemony appear tellingly 
across opposing types of theory. 
Related claims about the "end of left and right" hold that the primary 
ideological and policy alternatives, which formerly constituted the modern 
political spectrum and marked the main divisions between postwar ide­
ologies and parties, have been neutralized. Although the various renditions 
of this view diverge with regard to hopes about the future, most suggest 
that the major political parties converge and that their self-acclaimed 
programs for change are gridlocked. For example, the critical theorist 
Ferenc Feher (1995) argued that the revolutions of 1989 "deconstructed" 
the left-right polarity, emptying it of meaning. Although contesting Fu-
kuyaman neoliberalism, Feher saw class politics to have been replaced 
by ambiguous "tribalism."5 Leading theorist of the European New Right, 
Alain de Benoist (1995) also declares an "end of the left-right dichotomy," 
arguing that, in France, the major parties' centrist moves capitulate to 
neoliberalism and offer no "real" choices. Unable to regulate and control 
the activities and influence of global firms, markets, and media, he holds, 
political leaderships now stress routine management of everyday affairs, 
executed increasingly in similar ways. Benoist's points about the end of 
left and right have a highly ambiguous tone, sounding like critiques from 
the left and converging with Feher. The liberal Anthony Giddens (1994a) 
puts a much more positive spin on the changes, arguing that the ex­
haustion of left and right opens space for a "third way" or new cultural 
politics that reframes "radicalism" in a participatory democratic fashion. 
But Giddens's ideas and his role in Tony Blair's "New Labor" government 
suggest exactly the type of move to the managerial center asserted by 
5 F or opposing views on the viability of left and right, see Habermas (1990), Bobbio 
(1996, 1998), and Anderson (1998a, 1998&). 
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Benoist.6 Also speaking of the end of left and right, even the optimistic 
Ulrich Beck stresses "congestion" or "paralysis"; "Politics is becoming a 
silent movie, or, more accurately, a sound movie without the soundtrack. 
People move their lips and pound the keyboards, but nothing comes out!" 
(Beck 1997, p. 149). These diverse thinkers imply that, even when old 
postwar party names remain, convergent mass politics no longer provide 
alternative sociopolitical visions. 
AFTER MODERNIZATION 
Neoliberal and Postmodern Ascent: The Withering Social State 
Fresh modern theories arose with the post-World War II era sociopolitical 
reconstruction, explosive economic growth, and collapse of classical co­
lonialism. The main non-Marxian position portrayed a sociocultural tran­
sition to a fully modern pattern of values and organizational structure, 
which reflected and justified the postwar era's Keynesian capitalism. The 
leading postwar sociologist, Talcott Parsons, expressed the period's highly 
optimistic beliefs about "modernization," and his theories bore the imprint 
of the Pax Americana. He saw the United States as the "lead society" or 
model for global development; backwardness would be overcome by con­
vergence of communist regimes with the U.S.-led West and the univer-
salization of the West's "evolutionary breakthroughs." Against the New 
Left and late 1960s ferment, Parsons rejected mounting "ideological pes­
simism" about modernization having "suddenly come to an end." He held 
presciently that rationality, sociocultural difference, and community were 
becoming major areas of conflict, but he insisted that a new, improved 
modernity was still dawning. Seeing its "'culminating' phase" as "a cen­
tury or more" away, he declared that the idea of "'postmodern' society" 
was "decidedly premature" (1971, pp. 142-43). He did not doubt mod­
ernization's progressive path.7 Social democrats expressed even stronger 
faith in science, planning, and administration as motors of progress than 
did Parsons. Although debating appropriate levels of redistribution and 
regulation, leading postwar modern theories stressed the "state's" vital 
6 On Giddens's "third way" and "New Labor," see the Economist (1998) and Boynton 
(1997). 
Parsons's System of Modern Societies summarized his views on modernization long 
after he formulated his quasi-evolutionary "general theory." Although holding that 
Europe retained backward aristocratic features (resisting full "Americanization") and 
that modernization would remain uneven and conflictive in the non-Western world, 
he doubted "that any major part of the world will settle into a clearly nowmodern 




role in coordinating an upgraded, accelerated, and planned process of 
progressive modernization. 
During the mid- and late-1970s crises, however, neoliberals attacked 
postwar modernization policies and theories. Seeing state interventionism 
as the cause rather than cure for "market failures," they tried, with sub­
stantial success, to dismantle postwar-era "guided capitalism." After the 
victories of Thatcher, Reagan, and Kohl, the "neoliberal counterrevolu­
tion" brought neoclassical economic theory and free market, free trade 
monetarist policies to the center stage of policy making. The revolutions 
of 1989, the collapse of Eastern European communism, and the worldwide 
erosion of socialism raised this neoliberal tide. Emphasis on Hayekian 
"spontaneous orders" replaced the Keynesian "visible hand." Waging an 
effective campaign against the Great Society and "wasteful regulation," 
U.S. neoliberals held that the state's social and regulatory arms constitute 
the main source of economic inefficiency, the central threat to liberty, and 
the primary cause of poverty. They contended that economic revival, 
community empowerment, and individual self-help required drastic re­
duction of redistribution and regulation. Neoliberalism defeated decisively 
competing left and right corporatist, industrial-planning models. Fusing 
the libertarian and cultural right into a neoconservative alliance, neo­
liberals retained the idea of progress, sans postwar themes of social justice 
and inclusion.8 
Postmodernism raised even more basic challenges to postwar modern­
ization, reviving the types of fundamental critiques of modernity posed 
after World War I. Postmodernists amplified wider disenchantment with 
science and rationality, but dwelled on the repressive side of the welfare 
state and labor-centered left, seeing their Enlightenment baggage as the 
source of festering problems of environmental degradation, sociocultural 
exclusion, and soulless regimentation and homogenization. Although 
partly rooted in "New Left" sensibilities and "sixties radicalism" (e.g., 
Stephens 1998), postmodernism arose in a broader climate of change on 
the left, shifting from postwar-era emphases on national parties, labor-
oriented leaderships, state-centered reforms, and social planning to local 
organizations, pluralistic alliances, identity politics, and risk avoidance 
and from material needs, structure, and class to culture, agency, and 
discourse. Postmodernists held that the old left obscured plural sites of 
cultural domination, the marginalization of minorities, and consequent 
8 Neoliberal restructuring has varied across regional and national settings; different 
models of capitalism persist (e.g., Boyer 1998). On neoliberalism, see e.g., Harrison 
and Bluestone (1988), Davis (1992), Harrison (1994), Brohman (1996), Gordon (1996), 
Frankel (1997, pp. 76-89), Greider (1997), Braun (1997), Brenner (1998). On 1970s 
corporatist alternatives in the United States, see Paretsky (1996), 
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problems of "identity," "recognition," "surveillance," and "normalization." 
They saw modern theories, especially Marxist ones, to be part of the 
system of control. Treating capitalism more benignly and indirectly, they 
implied a reliance on market-based institutions and a more affirmative 
view of mass culture and mass consumption. Overall, however, post­
modernists heralded an end of postwar modernization and its exhaustion 
as a normative project or progressive endpoint to be achieved. 
Although too complex and ambiguous a terrain to be accounted for by 
a single factor, postmodernists and modern theorists alike stress post-
modernism's connection to neoliberalism (e.g., see Bell 1996; Jameson 
1984; Harvey 1989; Leinberger and Ticker 1991; Smart 1992; Bauman 
1992; Kumar 1995; Antonio and Bonanno 1996; Ashley 1997; Castells 
1996, 1997, 1998). Both approaches came into prominence in the United 
States and Europe, between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, when the post­
war political-economic and sociocultural complexes were eroding and 
changing. Although usually opposing economic rationalism, postmodern­
ists attack the old left as sharply as do the neoliberal critics. Contending 
that consumption and lifestyle have replaced production and work as the 
pivotal facets of sociocultural life, postmodernists hold that neoliberal­
ism's highly differentiated niche markets decenter and localize consump­
tion, subvert rigid, conformist, worker-bee selves, and put an end to class 
politics. They usually applaud the decline of the Protestant ethic and 
bourgeois, work-centered life. All but the most pessimistic postmodernists 
see consumer goods, mass media, and market-mediated lifestyles as con­
tested terrains, repositories of difference, and arenas for articulating plural 
selves. Eschewing Marxian and Frankfurt school critiques, they imply 
that neoliberal nitchification and commodification reduce cultural con­
straints, expand options, and liberate desire and the body. Affirming the 
transition from high Fordism's centralized, standardized mass production 
and mass consumption and conformist workaday culture to a more di­
verse, decentered, and culturally tolerant post-Fordism, they shift from 
the critique of capitalism to cultural criticism and break more sharply 
from the old left than did New Left critics. 
Postmodernists treat the interventionist welfare state as the linchpin of 
bankrupt postwar modernization and therapeutic repression. They usually 
reject the idea of publicly planned social progress, arguing that the post­
war social state tolerated, justified, and even orchestrated domination and 
exclusion. For example, Jean-Francois Lyotard held that Marxism and 
Keynesianism "program" technocracy and justify the "totalizing" practices 
of capitalist and socialist "system managers" (1984, pp. 12-13). His hyper-
radical poststructuraiist critique dismissed the democratic facets of post­
war society and culture as illusory, yet his extreme pluralist, anticonsensual 
stance implied an individualism that has affinity for the very liberalism 
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it purports to reject (Ferry and Renaut 1990, pp. xvi, 15-19, 64-67). 
Taking an even a dimmer view of "social engineering," the U.S. post­
modernist Charles Jencks described Pruitt-Igoe (a St. Louis public housing 
project and high-rise ghetto) as the prototypical outcome of postwar mod­
ernization; he viewed its demolition as the dawn of postmodernity (1986, 
pp. 180-81, 371-73). Ranging from Foucauldian broadsides against the 
therapeutic state to milder critiques of postwar planning and risk man­
agement, postmodernist approaches converge with neoliberal arguments 
that the scaled-down social state will reduce repression, empower com­
munities, and free individuals (see, e.g., Jencks 1986). 
Although viewing optimistically the post-postwar era as "second" or 
"reflexive" modernity, Ulrich Beck (1992a, 19926, 1997) and Anthony Gid-
dens (1994a) share postmodern sensibilities about the failed left and the 
superiority of cultural politics. They hold that the postwar left's overly 
ambitious, state-centered, egalitarian policies justified the era's formulaic 
knowledge, top-down procedures, and technocracy. Beck's glowing ac­
count of a supposed shift from the postwar "authoritarian action state" 
to today's "negotiation state" presumes unproblematic continuance of 
postwar welfarism and ignores completely neoliberal erosion, polarization, 
and counterforces (1997, pp. 26, 95, 140). His declarations about the end 
of class and the "individualization of social inequality" seem very far­
fetched in the United States (e.g., where about 50% of African-American 
and Hispanic children are born into poverty). Except for historical ref­
erences, capitalism is largely invisible in such accounts of "reflexive 
modernity." 
Critics charge that postmodernists take "on the color" of neoliberalism 
and act as if capitalism "does not exist" (e.g., Eagleton 1996, p. 23; 2izek 
1997, p. 46; Rorty 1998, pp. 35-37, 87). Normative views aside, post­
modernists and their critics alike betray a substantial loss of confidence 
in the state, serious erosion of the political mechanisms that were once 
believed to guide modernization and social progress, and increased he­
gemony of the economic over the political. These themes cut across the 
endings' discourses and arguments about the convergence of left and right 
Efforts to cope with this perceived weakening of regulatory capacity can 
lead toward very different types of regimes, but a rising chorus calls for 
a return of the political (e.g., Mouffe 1993). 
"Cultural Postmodernization": Fractal Culture Rules 
Cultural postmodernization refers to the sociocultural processes and over­
all pattern of change that have manifested and fostered the ideological 
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and policy trends mentioned above.9 Diverse thinkers imply that the pro­
cess is producing the basic sort of change that Weber held would stimulate 
fundamental theoretical shifts, but they disagree over its form, impact, 
and periodization. I stress three themes that have been important focal 
points of debate and crucial contexts for the erosion of postwar modern­
ization theories and for convergent themes addressed by postmodernist 
and reactionary tribal theory. 
The idea of autoreferential culture, one of the most widely debated 
facets of postmodernization, holds that culture operates according to its 
own autonomous logic, free from modern theory's formative sociological 
substrates (e.g., Durkheimian association or Marxian class or value). This 
view emphasizes a split between the "signifier" and "signified" (i.e., sym­
bolic codes lack shared conceptual and external referents or common 
meanings and objects) and consequent semiotic determination (e.g., Baud-
rillard 1983a, 19836; Jameson 1984, pp. 60-62,80-88; 1991; Bauman 1992, 
pp. 149-55; Kumar 1995, pp. 101-48; Eagleton 1996, pp. 14-15, 121-35). 
Extreme positions treat culture as a totally autonomous "regime of sig­
nification" (i.e., signifiers circulate in a purely contingent manner and all 
"real" factors, alleged as "beneath" or "behind," are "simulated"). They 
reduce society to an all-encompassing "cultural surface" that is uncon­
strained by "material" or "structural" factors. Modern theorists and many 
postmodernists attack this position for its radical culturalism, but they 
still concede that it expresses a major qualitative or postmodern shift in 
cultural experience that weakens the social and the ability to represent 
it. They see postmodern "depthlessness" as a "cultural dominant" or per­
vasive facet of bounded domains of the mass media, consumer culture, 
the arts, and certain other major parts of sociocultural life. Modern the­
orists theorize postmodernism as a "logic" of late capitalism, but they 
warn that the culture's simulated appearance subverts their own claims 
about its "depth" determinants (e.g., Jameson 1984, 1991; Bell 1996; Har­
vey 1989; Eagleton 1996). They reject arguments about total autonomy 
and total fragmentation, but they still contend that postmodern culture 
undermines audiences' capacities to grasp, assimilate, apply, or even take 
seriously their theories or other systematic efforts to analyze or intervene 
in social life. The difference between extreme and moderate positions may 
be less than modern theorists wish to admit. Their very heated critiques 
9 Neoliberal theories and postmodernist theories are part of cultural postmodernization. 
Thus, "causal" connections between them and other facets of the overall process are 
complex. On postmodernism and postmodernization, see e.g., Harvey (1989), Best and 
Kellner (1991), Jameson (1991), Bauman (1992), Smart (1992), Dickens and Fontana 
(1994), Kumar (1995), Ashley (1997), Antonio (1998). 
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of the process reveal a fear that Baudrillard is right; that the line between 
TV and the rest of culture has been elided (1990). 
A closely related theme, antinniversalism, opposes the alleged regi­
menting, homogenizing force of universal values, concepts, laws, and pol­
icies and manifests a deep suspicion or outright denial of cross-group 
consensus. This particularlist current is amplified by Derridian and Ly-
otardian mantras about waging "war on totality," celebrating "difference," 
and embracing "local knowledge." Antiuniversalism runs counter to the 
"grand narratives" that legitimized modernization and attributed it gen­
eral significance. From this vantage point, Marx's materialist theory of 
history, Habermas's reconstructive ethics, and Rawls's deontology all 
erase cultural difference and justify repression (e.g., Lyotard 1984; Bau-
man 1992, 1993; Rawls 1971; Habermas 1984, 19876). The same tenden­
cies are manifested in objections to ideas of general "emancipation" and 
"difference blind" social rights (e.g., Gutmann 1994; Nicholson 1996). The 
crucial question is whether this particularism is so strong that it precludes 
the possibility of divergent groups communicating, reaching uncoerced 
agreements, and living together cooperatively and peacefully. In matters 
of race and ethnicity, antiuniversalist views range from support for affir­
mative action and recognition of minority differences to advocacy of racial 
separatism or from efforts to preserve local communities and regional 
dialects to "ethnic cleansing." They sometimes pit preservation of national, 
communal, or subgroup particularities and identities against wider, more 
impersonal, or universal forms of solidarity, citizenship, or rights. Such 
positions imply that "ethnos" is or should be the ascendent factor in socio­
political solidarities. Enlightenment universalism is equated with cultural 
homogenization, the destruction of community, and the evaporation of 
cultural autonomy. However, debates rage over whether this anti­
universalism counters postwar excesses and favors cultural liberation or 
fosters insularity, internecine conflict, and repression (e.g., Schlesinger 
1992; Benhabib 1996; Barber 1996). 
Stressing the centrality of "new social movements" (NSMs), diverse 
thinkers argue that cultural politics are ascendent over class or the re­
distributional politics of welfare-state liberalism, social democracy, and 
Marxism and have shifted politically oriented collective action and social 
criticism from a primarily modern, material, universal plane to a post­
modern, discursive, local one. The environmental movement posed basic 
challenges to modernization, shifting to postmaterialist ideals and opening 
wider, more-inclusive public dialogue about the risks, costs, and blindspots 
of top-down applications of science and planning and of unsustainable, 
harmful development policies. Environmentalism decouples moderniza­
tion from sociocultural progress and stresses local action. But the politics 
of "recognition" or "identity" have more globally widespread, diverse 
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forms and are prime carriers of the culturalist and antiuniversalist ten­
dencies mentioned above. Stressing disparaged marginalized strata (e.g., 
racial-ethnic minorities, lesbians and gays, women), they address types of 
cultural exclusion and damage, exacerbated or ignored by postwar politics. 
Intense battles rage about the status of NSMs, especially over the question 
of whether they reconstitute the left in a new pluralist alliance politics 
based on a nascent ideal of "heterotopian" democracy or are an ambiguous, 
mainly professional middle-class politics that make some progressive gains 
but add to sociopolitical fragmentation and leave the poorest and weakest 
people to languish.10 Putting aside this debate, advocates and critics agree 
that NSMs shift the focus of politics and theory from class and capitalism 
to culture and the state. NSMs are part of a global wave of subgroup, 
regional, and nationalist struggles for cultural identity and autonomy. 
Strong-Program Postmodernism: Total Critique of Modernity 
Cultural postmodernization has divergent impacts and generates diverse 
theoretical responses. My focus, below, is on "strong-program post­
modernism," which amplifies the extreme versions of the three dimensions 
of postmodernization discussed above. Neutralizing the sociocultural pre­
suppositions of modern theory, this view poses a "total critique of mo­
dernity." In general, postmodernists see theory and science as perspectivist 
"narratives" arising from, justifying, and reproducing hegemonic relations 
and identities of specific sociocultural locations. But strong-program post­
modernism abandons all "truth" claims, viewing social theory and science 
exclusively as narratives, rejecting references to "realities" external to the 
theoretical text, and dismissing "objective" inquiry about the "validity" 
10 Enthusiastic supporters see NSMs as entirely new forms of symbolic expression and 
collective action, instituting fresh types of cultural goals and radical democratic dia­
logues (beyond mass political parties and administrative systems). They claim that 
NSMs reframe the old left in a more discursive, critical, inclusive, and participatory 
fashion, breaking fundamentally with "interest-group politics" and constituting a new 
overall sociopolitical steering mechanism (e.g., Giddens 1991, 1992,1994c, 1994b; Beck 
1992a, 19926, 1994, 1996, 1997; Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994; Gutmann 1994; Mel-
lucci 1996). By contrast, critics argue that NSMs are fractious interest-group politics 
that split the left and ignore economic injustice (e.g., Wood 1986, 1995; Gitlin 1995; 
Eagleton 1996; izek 1997). Harsher critics see NSM leaderships and core members 
as a "new class" of bureaucratically entrenched, "politically correct," pseudo-left pro­
fessionals (e.g., Piccone 1990-91; Lasch 1995). For contrasting views about the shift 
to cultural politics, see Judith Butler (1998), and Nancy Fraser (1998, 1995, 1997). 
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of theories or how well they represent "reality."1' In this view, claims that 
theory can grasp obdurate external realities are foundationalist distortions 
that obscure culture's "constructed" nature. Arguing that perspectives 
from divergent locations are incommensurable and impervious to inter-
subjective consensus, it neutralizes the keystone of reflexive versions of 
modern and postmodern social theory—the "communication model" or 
the presupposition that people, from different social locations can, at least 
in principle, reach uncoerced understandings about problems, theories, 
methods, concepts, empirical claims, and policies by employing systematic 
methods of knowledge production and adhering to norms of f ree inquiry 
and open discussion. The communication model does not substitute ho­
mogeneity for multifarious differences but implies that communicative 
"give and take" favors appreciation of difference and the peaceful reso­
lution of conflicts, which, reducing reliance on raw power and nurturing 
mutual recognition, make possible uncoerced cooperation.12 
Usually entwined with radical identity politics, the "politicized" variant 
of strong-program postmodernism contends that the cognitive and nor­
mative interests of hegemonic sociocultural relations are inscribed so in­
delibly in modern theory and science that their empirical, interpretive, 
and analytical standards of judgment are totally politicized and dis­
torted.13 Suspending "epistemological privilege," the politicized strong pro-
" Two major qualifications are in order. First, the strong program is sometimes ex­
pressed as an overall theory, but appears more often- as a theme or declaration in 
mixed versions of postmodernist theory. Second, reflexive postmodernism, or the "weak 
program," converges with reflexive types of modern theory, manifesting the Enlight­
enment's critical side and opposing its Cartesian tendencies (i.e., disembodied ideas of 
objectivity and representation that ignore sociocultural location and that exaggerate 
claims about neutral, total, certain representation). Reflexive postmodernism acknowl­
edges power-knowledge, simulation, and cultural difference and criticizes unrefiexive 
modern theories accordingly. By contrast to the strong program, however, it does not 
hold that postmodernization requires that modern epistemology and communicative 
ideals be dumped. Addressing critically technocratic, scientistic, and antidemocratic 
aspects of postwar modernization, reflexive postmodernism qualifies, specifies, and 
historicizes theory and science. Thus, it continues Enlightenment internal criticism 
and scales down imperious Reason, but it does not embrace irrationalism (see Antonio 
1998). 
12 Reflexive social theorists understand that the ideal of uncoerced communication is 
very often violated in practice but see its fatalistic rejection to enthrone manipulation, 
coercion, and irrationality. See e.g., Kloppenberg (1986), Habermas (1984, 19870) 
Dewey ([1925] 1988a, pp. 132-90; [1938] 1986, pp. 48-122), Antonio and Kellner (1992a), 
Antonio (1991, 1998). 
13 Strong-program versions of queer theory or feminist theory claim that the intersub-
jective standards that govern inquiry are so one-sidedly heterosexual, phallocentric, 
or masculinist that they cannot be disentangled from the practices of power or produce 
valid knowledge for queer or female subjects (Seidman 1991a, 19916, 1992; Richardson 
1991). By contrast, reflexive-postmodernist feminists or queer theorists also aim at 
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gram rejects judging and ranking knowledge according to its purported 
capacity to represent reality. Rather, it holds that treating theory and 
science as self-interested "texts" or "stories" puts discredited minorities' 
marginalized ideas, values, and ways of life on the same plane as those 
of hegemonic strata and prevents them from being disparaged by epis-
temological slighting. Although retaining taints of Marxian "standpoint 
theory," this view treats sociocultural locations and identities as all-
determining forces and reduces knowledge to hermetically sealed cellular 
standpoints. Consequent subversion of th e communication model forbids 
the cross-group consensus and cooperation needed to sustain this posi­
tion's usual espoused multicultural ideals. 
A second or "depoliticized" version of the strong program suggests a 
more radical relativism and profound disintegration of modern theory's 
cultural bases. At the height of the postwar era, Henri Lefebvre 
held—explaining his break from Marxist historicism and progressiv-
ism—that new forms of media and information production reduce "social 
reality" to a "system of signs and significations" and that it "loses all its 
solidity, its substantiality and its frames of reference; it begins to crum­
ble—or rather, to evaporate." Hence arises, he warned, a "world of bore­
dom" and "nostalgia," ruled by the "aleatory" or complete chance ([1962] 
1995, pp. 204, 222-23). Radicalizing this view in the 1970s and 1980s, 
Jean Baudrillard held that all-pervasive "simulation" melts all that is solid 
into a flat, fluid cultural surface of incommensurable, fragmented, tran­
sitory, "floating signifiers." Arguing that all distance from the text is lost 
and that cultural representations are self-referential, he precludes social 
knowledge and favors purely aesthetic responses (e.g., Baudrillard 1983a, 
19836). In his view, modern theory's core epistemological and normative 
distinctions (e.g., ideal-real, true-false, good-bad, base-superstructure, cul­
ture-society) have evaporated. Thus, "progressive" facets of history are 
not distinguishable from their opposites. All dissolves into pure contin­
gency, ending communication, meaning, and sociality and foreclosing the 
basic democratic presupposition that people are capable of absorbing 
information, digesting it critically, and employing it reasonably in citi­
zenship, popular sovereignty, and social cooperation. In this version of 
major transformations of mainstream views of gender and sexuality and criticize mod­
ern theories accordingly, but their ideas of social knowledge parallel reflexive modern 
theorists. Their qualified idea of "objectivity" takes account of its situated, plural 
nature, yet averts standpoint theory's radical relativism. They believe that social sci­
ence's effectiveness increases with the recognition that its "truths" are plural, partial, 
imperfect, contingent, and transitory and that engagements between diverse com­
munities, beliefs, and ideas make social knowledge richer, wider, and stronger. They 
see social knowledge as much more than a self-enclosed, in-group narrative; it can 
and should extend far beyond the theorist's circumscribed location (e.g., Haraway 
1988; Fraser 1995; West 1989, 1993; Seidman 1996a, 19966). 
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the strong program, the "end of politics" goes hand in hand with the "end 
of history," Radicalizing the idea of cultural exhaustion and the total 
critique of modernity, it opens the way for postliberal critiques and "so­
lutions." As I will explain below, reactionary tribalist theorists converge 
with and appropriate from the politicized strong program, posing an ex­
treme version of i dentity politics and standpoint theory in order to over­
come the depoliticized strong program's nihilism, which they hold suffuses 
cultural life under neoliberal rule. 
AFTER POSTMODERNISM: REACTIONARY TRIBALISM 
Instead of "Demos," Society, Covenant—Ethnos, lYibe, Race! 
(Aural Kolnai 1938, p. 431) 
Retribalization: Against the Market and the Neoliberal State 
Retribalization refers to a neopopulist resurgence of group identities an­
chored in ethnic community.14 For example, a right-wing populist states: 
"The end of the Cold War has given us the New World Order but also 
made manifest the tendency of the modern world toward tribalism. The 
tendency runs deep, Man forms tribes because he knows what he is by 
contrast with what he is not, and because a single worldwide society is 
far too vast for feelings of participation and loyalty. When he finds himself 
in a society that lacks the cohesion to be a community man remains a 
political animal and finds means to create some form of polis" (Kalb 1998, 
pp. 1-2). Globalization, deregulation, and the erosion of the Cold War 
geopolitical system helped fuel new aspirations and struggles for local 
autonomy and assertions of collective identity against freely moving cap­
ital, goods, jobs, people, and images. New tribalism bears the imprint of 
and helps drive postmodernization, especially its centrifugal forms of cul­
tural fragmentation, antiuniversalism, and identity politics. It also raises 
important questions about the role and vitality of the democratic state, 
141 employ "ethnic" to designate diverse types of "tribes," based on linguistic, religious, 
racial, and other cultural differences. Examples of right-wing neopopulism are the 
French National Front, the Italian Northern League, the Belgian Vlaarns Blok, the 
German Republican Party, the British National Party, New Zealand First, the Indian 
Bharatiya Janata Party, and the U.S. League of the South. On retribalization see, Boyte 
and Riessman (1986), Bauman (1992, pp. 136-37,196-200), Betz (1994), Piccone (1995), 
Maffesoli (1996), Barber (1996), Betz and Immerfall (1998), Hughey (1998). On ethnic 
identity in a hybrid age, see Appiah and Guttman (1996) and Walzer (1997). 
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especially its capacity to cope with and preserve cultural difference.15 The 
new tribes often charge that postwar social democracies and today's neo-
liberal states do not recognize or support adequately their group partic­
ularities and that liberal universalism "homogenizes" difference. Tribalism 
suffuses the NSMs, which stress open dialogue and active citizenship and 
embrace multicultural civil society and representative democracy, but it 
is also pervasive in reactionary types of xenophobia, racism, violence, 
and, genocide (e.g., Bosnia, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Northern Ireland, the 
U.S. Aryan Brotherhood, and Identity Christianity). 
Even Fukuyama warned that prosaic economism and cultural relativ­
ism make neoliberal regimes vulnerable to attack from the far right (1992, 
pp. xxii-xxiii, 181-244, 300-39). Discussing Fukuyama, Allan Bloom held 
that if "an alternative is sought there is nowhere else to seek it. I would 
suggest that fascism has a future, if not the future" (1989, p. 21). When 
belief in modernization was strong and the memory of fascism was vivid, 
protofascism was usually seen as an irrational reflex or symptom of a 
collective character disorder. However, New Right critiques of the cul­
turally fragmenting, depoliticizing impacts of neoliberalism and post-
modernization are sophisticated and innovative and deserve serious con­
sideration. In light of today's escalating forms of bloody retribalization 
(e.g., Kosovo and East Timor) and deepening economic and cultural crises 
in important regions (e.g., Russia), claims that such radical right views 
may become more widely popular do not seem so far-fetched. Roger Ea~ 
twell attaches special significance to resurgent radical conservative the­
ories and European New Right theories. He states that 
the most promising form of neofascist radicalism in terms of burying the 
past is the attempt to rehabilitate the German conservative revolutionaries, 
like Ernst Jiinger . . . and key intellectuals who supported fascism, like 
Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger. . . . The French New Right, in par­
ticular its key theorist Alain de Benoist, has turned to the conservative 
revolutionaries and Schmitt for much of its inspiration, particularly to their 
ideas on the importance of re-creating national identity. (Eatwell 1997, p. 
360) 
15 For example, see debates over Habermas's and Rawls's left-liberal universalism 
(e.g., Habermas 1984, 19876, 1993, 1996, 1998; Rawls 1971, 1996; Benhabib and Dall-
mayr 1990; Strong 1992), communitarian critiques of liberalism and universalism (e.g., 
Sandel 1998, 1996; Bellah et al. 1986; Maclntyre 1988; Selznick 1992; Etzioni 199S; 
Bell 1995; Guttman 1994; Walzer 1997; Mulhall and Swift 1992, and Philosophy and 
Social Criticism 14 [nos. 3, 4]), and discussions of identity politics (e.g., Schlesinger 
1992; Giddens 1994a; Gitlin 1995; Hobsbawn 1996; Rorty 1998; and Benhabib 1996). 
These approaches all focus ultimately on the problematic nature of political community 
and power after the blurring of boundaries by capital mobility, global mass culture, 
transnational entities (e.g., NAFTA and the European Union), and immigration. 
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Although still objectionable in "polite company," Eatwell warns, neo-
fascist theories offer a countervision that could become much more widely 
embraced, especially in an economic downturn. 
European New Right: The Return of the Political 
The European New Right claims to fuse the radical antiliberal facets of 
left and right into a new, vibrant "Third Way." For example, New Right 
opposition to African, Middle Eastern, or Asian immigration stresses the 
evils of capitalist globalization, resistance to cultural homogenization, and 
defense of cultural identity and difference. Their pleas for "ethnoplural-
ism" transmute plans to repatriate immigrants into a left-sounding anti-
imperialist strategy championing the autonomy of all cultural groups and 
their right to exert sovereignty in their living space. Claiming to counter 
"antiwhite racism," they argue that multiculturalism serves global capi­
talism's merciless leveling and that only exclusionary monoculture nur­
tures genuine cultural diversity. They also pose "green" agendas to protect 
their homelands from overpopulation, overdevelopment, and other rav­
ages of the neoliberal "New World Order" and latest and most exploitative 
phase of Enlightenment.16 They often deploy New Age spiritualism, in­
scribed in pagan or early Christian symbols, to foster reenchantment and 
remythologization. Following the New Left and today's postmodernist 
cultural left, the New Right stress the ascendancy of cultural politics. 
Reshaping radical conservatism for postmodern times, they employ cul­
tural studies' favorite forerunner theorist, Antonio Gramsci, an icon of 
their fusion of left and right and use his idea of "cultural hegemony" 
against the liberal left (e.g., Sunic 1990, pp. 14, 29-41). 
Eatwell holds that the New Right's "ideological core" is little changed 
from first-generation radical conservatism's "holistic-national radical 
Third Way" (1997, p. 361; emphasis in original). Recently resurrected and 
appropriated by the New Right, the original Weimar-era approaches bear 
the imprint of radical tribalism.17 Following Nietzschean antisociology, 
they charged that modern theorists elevate "decadent" values into guiding 
ideals and that their universalist grand narratives of modernization pro­
duce pernicious leveling of cultural particularity. They were influenced 
strongly by Nietzsche's antiliberalism and total critique of modernity, but 
16 Lambasting "Americo-cosmopolitanism," a British nationalist declares that only trib­
alism can save "our peoples and cultures and ethnic identities from homogenisation 
into bland burger-filling sludge by the global capitalist mincing-machine into which 
they are inexorably fed" (Charnot 1998, pp. 3). 
17 Aurel Kolnai's (1938) classic overview of fascist and protofascist theories was helpful 
in this section. Also, see Herf (1986), Lepenies (1988, pp. 334-49), Sunic (1990), Zim­
merman (1990), Aschheim (1992), Dahl (1996,1999), Woods (1996), and Pels (1998). 
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they reformulated his ideas into nationalist visions that he rejected. In­
verting the idea of a progressive shift from homogenous tribes, rooted in 
"ethnos," to plural modern societies, based on "demos," radical conser­
vatives held that modern theory affirms normatively an actual descent 
from animate cultural diversity to souless universal technocracy. They 
contended that modern democracy's melding of diverse ethnic groups into 
a mass "society" destroys their distinctive cultural identities.18 In their 
view, it dissolves cultural community into atomized, selfish, impersonal 
economic relations. Radical conservatives decried liberal-left efforts to 
impose formal and substantive equality, holding that allegedly suppressed 
natural inequalities ought to be cultivated and employed within the ranks 
of the domestic sociopolitical order. Overall, they envisioned an "organic" 
hierarchy of corporate groups and loyal subjects, regimented in a pseudo-
communal way under natural leaderships.19 
Heidegger held that "Europe lies in a pincers between Russia and Amer­
ica, which are metaphysically the same"; that is, their economism and 
instrumentalism causes a "darkening of the world" or "always-the-same-
ness" (1961, pp. 36-39). In his view, the hegemonic modern emphasis on 
technical rationality turns people into a timid, powerless, mediocre, ni­
hilistic mass or a totally homogenized technological civilization devoid of 
cultural creativity. Heidegger and other radical conservatives contended 
that capitalism and socialism are both rooted in the West's characteristic 
universalistic rationalism. Still manifesting this exhausted cultural com­
plex, they held, left-wing "revolution" cannot forge a genuinely new cul­
ture. They still considered communism an especially dangerous and for­
midable enemy, fearing that its antiliberal communalism, statism, and 
internationalism could forge the solidarity and discipline that are lacking 
in liberal democracy. They believed that the left could grab political power, 
but that would merely harden the grip of bankrupt Western civilization. 
They thought that communism's instrumentalist, egalitarian rationali­
zation would suppress all opposition and be the bane of all culture. Radical 
conservatives hoped that radical segments of the cultural left, sharing 
18 E thnic differences were often seen to be biologically based. However, sophisticated 
theorists, such as Carl Schmitt, provided essentialist cultural justification for exclu­
sionary ethnic policies. For example, Schmitt argued that Arab immigrants to France, 
unwilling to give up Moslem religious law, cannot be integrated into French culture 
and that Australian efforts to curb Asian immigration manifest an awareness of ob­
durate cultural differences that preclude assimilation into a European order ([1926] 
1988, pp. 8—17, 90—91 , nn. 26, 30). The New Right employs this view widely today, 
along with biological arguments. 
19 K olnai, held that they embraced "the ideal of 'organic' social order, of the 'natural' 
rule of aristocratic minorities"; "It is the old issue again Herrscha.fl versus Society: 
feudal loyalties versus reason and contract" (1938, pp. 644, 646). 
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their virulent hatred of liberal institutions and belief that bourgeois culture 
was totally spent, would join a "revolution from the right" aimed at de­
molishing sociocultural modernity and putting modern technology in the 
service a truly new cultural complex. Radical conservatives saw the po­
litical spectrum as a sharply bowed horseshoe; the extreme left occupies 
an opposite, but proximate end of the continuum. They hoped that left 
radicals would give up on their failed revolution and make the short jump 
to the extreme right, closing the "ends of a horseshoe" and encircling the 
common liberal enemy (Kolnai 1938, pp. 113, 235). 
Carl Schmitt's political thought is discussed, today, by diverse thinkers, 
but it is especially important for New Right theorists, who cite and employ 
it widely in their positions.20 Schmitt held that the "political" is an au­
tonomous domain that has primacy over other sociocultural realms. He 
argued that the "friend and enemy" dichotomy, the "strongest and most 
intense" social distinction, is the essence of the political. In his view, 
politics' vibrancy rises with the level of collective enmity toward the 
enemy and the more it is the decisive factor in group identity. He held 
that "the high points of politics" occur when enemies are recognized with 
"concrete clarity" as "other" or "different and alien." His theory had a 
fateful affinity for Nazi anti-Semitism. Expressing an extreme particu­
larism, similar to today's politicized version of strong-program postmod­
ernism, he saw the globe as a "pluriverse" of incommensurable, mutually 
impenetrable cultures and the friend-enemy polarity as the wellspring of 
their distinct identities. However, Schmitt warned that universal econo-
mism and egalitarianism are leveling these vital differences and that na­
tionalist politicization is needed to resist and stem the process ([1932] 1996, 
pp. 25-27, 53, 67-68). 
Schmitt charged that modern theory's core concept of "society," by 
treating the political as merely one of a plurality of associations and, thus, 
denying its primacy, gives free rein to fragmentation, atomism, and econ-
omism.21 Precluding a clear friend-enemy distinction, he held, modern 
20 Like Heidegger, Schmitt's role in the Nazi movement make him a very controversial 
theorist. Schmitt's Catholic roots and critique of political romanticism distinguish him 
from more Nietzschean radical conservatives (e.g., Schmitt [1925] 1986; Sunic 1990, 
pp. 43-50, 67-80). Although a crucial figure for the New Right, his ideas are sometimes 
employed in democratic discourses by left liberals and moderate conservatives (e.g., 
see Mouffe 1993; Kalyvas 1999; Turner 1996). For opposing views of Schmitt's thought, 
see Bendersky (1987) and Wolin (1992). Scanning Telos from the late 1980s to the 
present is informative about Schmitt's importance for the new fusions of right and 
left 
3i Schmitt claimed that the "friend-enemy grouping" forges "a decisive entity which 
transcends mere societal-associational groupings" (1996, p. 45; emphasis added). He 
argued that there is no need for the abstract idea of society, when the "essence" of the 
political is grasped correctly and rightfully empowered as the prime manifestation of 
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democracy's cultural diversity, pluralism, and multiparty politics generate 
all-pervasive conflicts of interest and heartless compromises, which de-
politicize the nation. By contrast to Weber's liberal view of domestic 
politics as peaceful debate, struggle, and compromise over confiictive val­
ues and interests, Schmitt held that the state should unify a people against 
enemy cultures. Liberal rejections of this genuine politics as repressive, 
he argued, justify the subordination of political community to markets 
and "possessive individualism." He wanted to see an end of politics in 
the liberal left sense of discursively mediated competition and voluntary 
cooperation between diverse groups, persons, parties, interests, policies, 
and values (Schmitt 1996, pp. 71-72; 1988, pp. 48-50). Schmitt saw the 
modern democratic state's internal bickering and brokering of interests 
as a mere shell of the political. Moreover, he held that its universalist 
idea of "humanity" favors "economic imperialism" and cultural homo­
geneity abroad as well as at home. Although sometimes sounding like a 
later Frankfurt school critic of "totally administered society," Schmitt 
called for a total state to restore the political's rightful primacy over 
capitalist society, combat enemies, and curb subjects' evil ways (1996, pp. 
45, 54-58, 62, 68-71). 
The recently revived European New Right repeats many of the first 
generation's positions, but it refashions the old ideas to fit culturally post-
modernized settings and to divorce its agenda from the former fascist 
regimes and from the Holocaust. The leading theorist of the French New 
Right, Alain de Benoist, provides an exemplary version of "postmodernism 
'of the right,"' trumpeting radical conservatism to the Derridian-sounding 
tune of the "right to difference," mixing Schmitt with Gramsci, and blur­
ring left and right (Taguieff 1993-94a, p. 103).22 Like others of the New 
Right, however, he rejects multiculturalism and takes a Schmittian view 
of European identities. He says he wants to protect continental ethno-
pluralism and to preserve the local cultures of Europe's diverse ethnic 
and linguistic groups, empowering them politically as autonomous re­
gional entities in a larger imperial unit. In his view, only federated "organic 
communities" can resist global neoliberalism and its seductive U.S.-
spawned consumerism and mass media. Following Schmitt, Benoist ad­
vocates nurturing local homogeneity to fight capitalism's universal ho-
a distinctive cultural community. The last section of Schmitt's (1996, pp. 69-79) essay 
provides a lucid example of radical conservative criticism of modern theory, especially 
liberal economism and pluralism. 
22 By contrast to Schmitt, Benoist calls for a Nietzschean break with Western culture's 
Christian roots. Widely influential in European New Right circles, his work is now 
often published in the U.S. journal Telos. On Benoist's place in the New Right, see 
Sunic (1990), Taguieff (1993-94a,1993-94/>) and Telos, nos. 98/99. On radical conser­
vatism and the New Right, see Dahl (1999). 
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mogenization, but he applauds active civic life, public discussion, direct 
democracy, and North American communitarism. His scathing broadsides 
against liberal individualism have a clear affinity for the Sandel-Bellah-
Taylor-Etzioni-Maclntyre critiques of fictional monads that are suppos­
edly able to choose, act, and frame identity independent of communal 
ties ("unencumbered selves"). His incisive attacks on neoliberal globali­
zation and Hayekian economics are quite scholarly and sophisticated, 
converging with work by the most able left liberal theorists. Rejecting Le 
Pen's Front National and openly racist nationalism, he claims to embrace 
NSM "politics of recognition." Believing the nation-state and left politics 
to be exhausted, Benoist contends that new assertions of collective identity 
and "proliferation of networks and multiplication of 'tribes'" offer alter­
natives to liberal left leveling (1993-946, pp. 195, 203-4; 1993-94a, pp. 
95-97; 1995, 1997, 1996a, 19966, 19986,, 1998c„ 1999). 
Benoist's direction is visible in his friendly references to Schmitt and 
other radical conservatives and in his equation of modern democracy with 
extreme domination and exhaustion (i.e., total atomization, instrumen-
talization, and homogenization). Seeing capitalist globalization as the 
cause of today's Third World diaspora, he holds that receiving states, 
countries of origin, and transplanted people themselves would all benefit 
from the repatriation of immigrants. He claims that such a move is the 
only way to preserve difference and foster a heterotopia of autonomous 
cultures or Schmittian pluriverse; only homogenous ethnically unified 
communities are capable of sustaining the type of collective identities 
needed to resist neoliberalism's grim reaper. Like Schmitt, Benoist stresses 
incommensurable culture, rather than biological difference. He rejects 
traditional racism and espouses cultural relativism and tolerance, but he 
argues that cultural differences cannot be mediated communicatively or 
regulated by common norms." His self-described "postmodern" move is 
supposed to counter the West's hegemonic rationalism and cultural im­
perialism, especially the allegedly corrosive force of its universal human 
rights and abstract notions of equality (which he argues serve liberal 
economism and homogenization). He treats democratic universalism and 
egalitarianism as protototalitarian tendencies, and he suggests that Sta­
linism and Nazism are rooted in liberal democratic culture's evaporation 
of particularity and that they provide a staging point for an organicist 
"Taguieff (1993-94a, p. 108) states that Benoist's "thesis of the radical pluralism of 
values implies a polylogism prohibiting dialogical communication and an absolute 
cultural relativism (which links the inability to communicate with the incompatibility 
of world views) and is compatible only with the affirmation of relative inequalities. 
Differentialist racism contests the 'racism' of any projection of differences or ine­
qualities on to a single or universal scale of values." For a critique of this interpretation, 
see Benoist (1999, pp. 44-48). 
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inversion of modern democracy. Benoist's convergence with postmodern-
ism's politicized strong program is transparent, except that following more 
consistently the logic of radical perspectivism's break with the commu­
nication model, he argues that cultural diversity can never be preserved 
in a multicultural society (Benoist 1993-94a, 1993-946, 1995; Taguieff 
1993-94a; Sunic 1990, pp. 125-51). 
Benoist claims to champion the "direct democracy" of the ancient Greek 
polis, but, like earlier radical conservatives, he leaves vague the actual 
mechanisms of political rule. He does imply, however, that they would 
invert liberal democracy. Praising the Greek polis for averting liberal 
fragmentation and paralysis and, thus, being "a community of citizens," 
Benoist sees "ancient democracy" as "genuine democracy." He attributes 
its cultural and political integration to the convergence of "demos and 
ethnos"; that is, citizenship was based on "common ancestry" or the "re­
verse" of liberal orders where equal rights derive from "the natural equal­
ity of a ll." He is aware that citizens of "ancient democracy" were usually 
a hereditary status order of landed and militarized propertyholders that 
relied on ruthless extraction from unfree slave and serf strata and that 
did not extend equal rights to women. Seeing such dominance and sub­
ordination as a natural facet of organic particularity, he asserts that "a 
certain hierarchical structure" does not diminish the democratic status of 
such regimes. His idea of ancient "liberty" inverts today's liberal demo­
cratic usages of the term. Rather than "emancipation from the collectivity," 
he argues, ancient liberty affirmed the individual's bond to the community 
and stressed "inheritance" and "adherence." Accordingly, he held that the 
"'liberty' of an individual-without heritage, i.e., of a deracinated individ­
ual, was completely devoid of any meaning." He also states casually that 
"slaves were excluded from voting not because they were slaves, but 
because they were not 'citizens' [i.e., not members of one of the polis's 
constituent phratries or clans]." In his view, the most vital facet of the 
polis was its exclusion of outsiders. Conversely, today's hegemonic prin­
ciples of universal citizenship and human equality preclude his preferred 
"aristodemocracy" (Benoist 1991). Benoist praised ancient imperial re­
gimes for similar reasons as the polis; they recognized individuals only 
through their membership in legally empowered corporate groupings or 
status orders (religions, ethnic groups, communities, and nations). By con­
trast to the modern nation-state's principle of voluntary association and 
countervailing power of individual rights, ancient groups were compul­
sory and had sweeping power over their flocks. For today, Benoist advises, 
"Imperial principle above, direct democracy below" (Benoist 1993-94a, 
p. 97). His hoped-for federated European monocultures, where political 
rights would be tied to ethnos, would empower compulsory groupings, 
forging communitarianism with an iron glove (Walzer 1997, pp. 14-19). 
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The undemocratic features of th e premodern polis, the empire, and the 
feudal state disappear in Benoist's rendering. Ignoring pervasive force 
and dependency, he praises their "democratic" facets, "spiritual character," 
solidarity, and integration of the "one and the many" (all emanating from 
the centrality of "ethnos" and participation limited by status-group mem­
bership) (Benoist 1993-946). He redefine's "direct democracy" as hierar­
chical monoculture, which overcomes today's normative emphases on 
universal citizenship, equal participation, and individual freedom. Posed 
as a revolutionary "alternative" to mass democracy and liberal institutions, 
his position, like earlier radical conservative arguments for "organic de­
mocracy," points toward protofascist pseudocommunity rather than self-
governing Gemeinschaft. This direction is manifested in his unproble-
matical description of the Weimar radical conservative Ernst Jiinger's 
"democracy of the state," or hierarchical order, based on "Prussian prin­
ciples of command," where "liberty and obedience are one" (Benoist 1998a, 
19986)." Equating modern democracy with spiritless mediocrity, deca­
dence, and deracination, Benoist postures when he expresses appreciative 
views of North American communitarians, who he must know aim to 
enliven the very types of representative democracy and liberal institutions 
that he despises. Claiming that everyone pretends to support democracy 
today, Benoist employs the term for his own purposes (1991, p. 26). His 
effort to locate himself as an "organic communitarian" who embraces 
"community" and "difference" manifests the postmodern split of signifier 
and signified (Benoist 1993-94a). 
Pitting "community" and "ethnos" against "society" and "demos," radical 
conservatives break with modern theory or the sociological presupposi­
tions of modern democracy. They see the "universe of the particular," or 
self-enclosed collective identities, as the only bulwark against homoge-
nization. Against universalism and human rights, they hold that divergent 
cultures cannot reach shared understandings or be judged by common 
standards. Their radical perspectivism parallels the essentialist standpoint 
philosophies of postmodernism's politicized strong program. However, 
they propose an exclusionary monoculture that follows consistently from 
their break with the communication model. Their inherently conflictive 
view of intergroup relations treat power-knowledge and dominance-
subordination as all-pervasive defining forces among the tribes. Most im­
portant, they transform the ideals of freedom and autonomy from qualities 
24 Distinguishing the "total state" (i.e., the "moribund, inflexible, mechanised, petrified" 
"totalitarian state") from the "democracy of the state," where "the leader" represents 
the community in a "supple, living, and organic" manner, Benoist is not troubled by 
the fact that these two regimes might be hard to separate or that both would be viewed 
as authoritarian by today's democratic standards (19986, pp. 7-8). Rather, he prefers 
the risks of a total state to modern democracy. 
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of individual citizens to attributes of a unitary, collective political subject. 
The radical conservative strategy of strengthening the political center and 
empowering groups over individuals is posed, today, as therapy for the 
homelessness, fragmentation, and unconstrained, nihilistic individualism 
that allegedly inhere in the neoliberal political economic regime and in 
cultural postmodernization. However, the total state lurks behind their 
critique. 
U.S. Paleoconservatism: Straussian Minimalism 
By contrast to European "nation-states," the United States has been pri­
marily an "immigrant state." The lack of a "permanent" ethnic majority 
and territorially based ethnic groups favor "imagined community" over 
that based on habitus. The emphasis on individual citizenship and ten­
dency to minimize recognition of group rights favors hybridization and 
weaker ethnos (Walzer 1997, pp. 30-35). Consumerism and media culture 
add to the individualizing and massifying tendencies. In this light, the 
United States offers little cultural basis for European-style New Right 
strategies (i.e., what "organic communities" exist to be saved?). However, 
the United States has its own version of r eactionary tribalism, appearing 
dramatically in recent years (e.g., Turner Diaries, militias, the Oklahoma 
City bombing, the Freemen, abortion clinic terrorism, and the Christian 
identity movement; see Bennett 1995; Coppola 1996; Lee 1997). The rad­
ical right protests multiculturalist criminalization of whites (i.e., as op­
pressors of colonial and indigenous people of color) and forfeiture of the 
nation's white Christian roots. Decrying U.S. nationality as mere "passport 
identity" or mere "citizenship," they argue that the hybridizing or washing 
away of ethnos threatens the survival of white Americans, disempowering 
them in ongoing culture wars with resurgent minorities. In Schmittian 
fashion, they call for the construction of "white identity" to oppose ethnic 
enemies and to "take back the nation." Although often disclaiming outright 
racism, they exploit fears about the intense U.S. racial split, minority 
population growth, and non-European immigration. Reactionary tribal­
ism is also fanned by growing tensions over the uneasy neoconservative 
alliance between "cultural conservatives" on the religious right, and "ec­
onomic conservatives" or libertarians and neoliberals. The appearance of 
"paleoconservativism" suggests a nascent political realignment and "new" 
vision on the U.S. right that has affinity for and ties to European New 
Right politics. Paleoconservatives attack neoconservatives for surrender­
ing U.S. sovereignty to the New World Order (e.g., the United Nations, 
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the International Monetary Fund, NAFTA) and capitulating to neoliber-
alism, consumer culture, liberal individualism, and multiculturalism.25 
Well known to postwar conservatives and a sophisticated forerunner 
of paleoconservativism, Leo Strauss posed fundamental challenges to 
modern theory. Straussian thought has roots in European radical conser­
vatism and affinity for key New Right tendencies, but its ambiguities 
preclude it from being located definitively in these camps.26 Straussian 
theory helped inspire the neoconservative movement, but, in the current 
shifting and increasingly tribalized political context, it offers a theoretical 
basis for a sharper antiliberal turn. Strauss fled Hitler's Germany and 
was mentor to many Cold War-era political theorists at the University 
of Chicago. Against the postwar high tide of Parsonsian modernization 
theory and liberal positivism, he urged a return to the philosophical "clas­
sics" and the Hellenistic and Judeo-Christian roots of Western culture. 
His ideas had formative impact on many leading neoconservatives, in­
cluding Fukuyama and Bloom, who articulated the "cultural issue" on 
the right. After modernization theory and progressive liberalism crashed 
and the "Reagan revolution" dawned, Straussians played a central role 
in the neoconservative cultural war against the moribund Johnsonian 
Great Society and against more recent postmodernism, multiculturalism, 
Clintonism, and other trends they see as undermining American civic 
morality.27 
A sharp critic of "mass society," Strauss anticipated later arguments by 
Daniel Bell and right-leaning communitarians about a major cultural 
crisis manifested in the 1960s counterculture and New Left and, later, 
suffused throughout consumer culture—the unrestrained self that escapes 
into "art" and "does not defer to anything higher" (Strauss [1968] 1995, 
25 On paleoconservatism, see Woltermann (1993), Francis (1993), Buchanan (1998), 
Gottfried (1990, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996); on the split on the American Right, see 
Commentary 107 (February 1997). 
26 Straussians do not always pose consistently antiliberal positions, and sometimes 
support global importation of liberal democracy and human rights. Paul Gottfried 
claims that some Straussians even became McGovern liberals (1993, pp. 156-57). I do 
not suggest a political consensus among Straussians. Strauss provided a sharp cultural 
critique of mass culture that has appeal beyond hardline cultural conservatives. 
27 For example, Robert Bork, William Bennett, Irving Kristol, William Kristol, Clar­
ence Thomas, Casper Weinberger, and John Silber were influenced by Strauss, but 
perhaps more important are the cadres of younger Straussians on congressional staffs, 
in conservative foundations, and in other centers of right-wing activism. They did not 
mature under a progressive liberal regime, and they perceive a "betrayal" of the Reagan-
era agenda. Thus, they often take more conservative positions. For insight into the 
polarization over Strauss's ideas, see the lively exchange between postmodernist Ri­
chard Rorty (1988) and Straussian Harvey C. Mansfield (1988) over Alan Bloom's 
(1987) Closing of the American Mind and Straussianism. For a liberal critique of 
Strauss, see Drury (1997). 
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p. 261). By contrast to classical philosophical and biblical emphases on 
"virtue" and "restraint," he argued, liberals, from Hobbes onward, shifted 
the emphasis from "duty" and "wisdom" to "right" and "consent" and, 
thereby, removed the constraints on desire and pleasure. In his view, they 
eroded communal bonds and social norms, suppressed natural inequali­
ties, and reduced life to a nihilistic "desire for self-preservation," "hedon­
ism," or "joyless quest for joy" (Strauss [1950] 1965, pp. 181-88, 248-51). 
Reminiscent of radical conservative critiques of American cultural ho-
mogenization, Strauss saw the United States, during the height of postwar 
liberalism, as the "land of the philistines." He claimed that its "mass 
society" renders "irrelevant all natural differences and therefore in par­
ticular also the racial differences one can easily visualize a society con­
sisting of racially different men and women each of whom dresses, has 
'fun,' mourns, talks, feels, thinks and is buried like everyone else" (Strauss 
1995, pp. 263, 272). 
Young Strauss was influenced profoundly by Heidegger's Nietzschean 
critiques of Western rationalism and universalism. He stressed emphat­
ically the importance of Heidegger's warnings about U.S. liberalism and 
Soviet communism producing a global "night of th e world" or culturally 
homogenous civilization based on technocracy and utilitarian self-pres­
ervation (a fear shared by Schmitt and today's New Right; see Strauss 
19896, pp. 38-44). Strauss addressed Schmitt very seriously, engaging his 
arguments about the friend-enemy distinction, liberal depoliticization, and 
restoration of the political and criticizing him for being too mild in his 
critique of liberalism.28 The imprint of Strauss's youthful engagement with 
Heidegger and Schmitt appears in his mature antiliberalism and his cri­
tiques of cultural homogenization and depoliticization. By contrast, how­
ever, to Heidegger's and Schmitt's drift toward protofascist strains of 
postmodern politics and the total state, Strauss wanted to revive belief 
in the absolutist foundations or "truth" of classical Western political phi­
losophy and religion, which he saw as the best counterforces to modern 
"historicism" and to the rampant erosion of moral authority (Strauss 1965, 
19896, pp. 24-26; 1989a, pp. 21-24). 
Strauss criticized Max Weber's distinction between facts and values 
and, especially, his perspectivist view of modern culture as a "war between 
the gods" or perpetual "value conflict." Although respecting Weber's "no­
ble nihilism," Strauss held, his "insight into the baseless character of eve­
rything noble" opens the door to nihilism and even fascism. Strauss feared 
that his historicism undercut all moral authority, preventing reason from 
mediating between or ranking values (Strauss 1965, pp. 42-43,48, 64-68). 
28 Schmitt recognized the incisiveness of Strauss's critique and, in response, altered 
some facets of his political theory (Strauss 1996; Meier 1995; Drury 1997, pp. 65-96). 
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Strauss saw Nietzsche as the ultimate author of nobie nihilism. However, 
in his view, Nietzsche grasped its sweeping cultural and political conse­
quences much more penetratingly than Weber, and, thus, averting futile 
efforts to justify modernity, exposed liberalism's profound exhaustion. 
Strauss implied that Heidegger and Schmitt followed Nietzsche's tracks. 
By contrast to these philosophers, however, he argued, average persons 
"cannot live without light, guidance, knowledge" or transcendental au­
thority (Strauss 1965, p. 74). He considered them too weak to handle the 
perspectivist insight that knowledge and values are mere historical prod­
ucts of cultural groups, with no ultimate "truth" or "foundation." Strauss 
implied that this insight goes astray and even mad in mass culture, where 
nihilism is lived in an ignoble, destructive way. He thought that a culture 
where "everything is permitted" leads to the strongman and the gulag. 
He implied that modern liberalism cannot, ultimately, support democracy, 
but he also thought that Nietzsche's devastating critique of modernity 
precluded a simple return either to Enlightenment reason or to traditional 
culture. Strauss himself shared the historicist view that ideas and values 
were only human creations and stressed, like radical conservatives, that 
the consequent cultural differences and "regimes" are incommensurable 
and mutually impenetrable (converging ironically with his radical per­
spectivist enemies). But he wanted to shelter average people, incapable 
of bearing responsibly the weight of such potentially harmful "basic 
truths." Thus, he advocated the "noble lie" to obscure these truths, keeping 
them "between the lines" in texts accessible only to philosophical elites. 
Flaying the role of a Nietzschean "ascetic priest," he aimed to counter 
liberalism's supposed apocalyptic breakdown of normative authority 
through cultivation of the belief that the "classics" contain timeless, bind­
ing, absolute Truths about the "good society."" He intended this simulated 
absolutism to substitute for modern theory's historicist and dialogical 
method, which, from his standpoint, leads inevitably to radical relativism, 
fragmentation, and nihilism (Strauss 1965, pp. 131-32; [1952] 1980, pp. 
34-36; 1989b, pp. 25-26, 42; 1989a, pp. 32-34, 81-98; Drury 1997, pp. 
91-96). 
Strauss insisted that the classics were "not egalitarian" and that the 
29 Nietzsche held that ascetic priests create theodicies that forge and reproduce socio-
cultural solidarity by channeling mass resentment inward to guilt and outward against 
collective enemies. He called for a new type of postmodern philosophical elite to break 
radically from theodicy and all foundationalism. However, Strauss rejected such im­
pulses and posed, as a cure for nihilism and historicism, the very foundationalist version 
of Truth that Nietzsche saw as priestly "ressentiment" and hoped to surpass. By contrast 
to Strauss's "noble lie," Nietzsche ([1887] 1969, p. 158) stressed authenticity: "All honor 
to the ascetic ideal insofar that it is honest! so long as it believes in itself and does not 
play tricks on us!" On Strauss and Nietzsche, see Lambert (1996, pp. 166-84). 
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"best men" should rule over the "vulgar." He held that "equal rights" for 
everyone is "most unjust" and that politics should reconcile "the require­
ment for wisdom with the requirement for consent." Conversely to egal-
itarianism, he argued, under "classic natural right wisdom takes prece­
dence over consent." In Strauss's view, the "classics rejected democracy" 
(i.e., because it gives primacy to "freedom" rather than to "virtue"), and 
they agreed that virtue, the true goal of political life, is best pursued by 
"aristocracy" (1965, pp. 140-42; 1989a, pp. 35, 39). He believed that the 
"best regime" is the "absolute rule of the wise" and that the "best prac­
ticable regime" is rule by "gentlemen" or the political "imitation" of a true 
philosophical elite. Sharing Schmitt's pessimism about human nature and 
seeing a great unalterable gulf between the "wise" (oriented to Thith) and 
"vulgar" (slaves to "lower impulses"), he held that political leaders must 
be ready to employ "forcible" or "despotic" restraint and suspend natural 
rights when threatened by "foreign enemies" and "subversive elements 
within society." But Strauss also stressed strategic compromises, implying 
that a "mixed regime," combining aristocracy and democracy, was the 
best for his day (1965, pp. 132-35, 140-42, 151-53, 160-61, 185). 
Strauss's shadow can easily be detected in recent cultural wars over 
the canon and postmodernism. But his view of the classics as a repository 
of absolute political TVuth suggests a more basic challenge to modern 
democracy than is raised by his neoconservative followers. His so-called 
noble lie obscures his ultimate perspectivist vision of culture, which con­
verges with postmodernism's politicized strong program. His point that 
the governing ideals and norms of political regimes should be treated as 
absolute makes them the aegis of a narrow intellectual and political elite 
and closes them to wider public dialogue. Thus he breaks with the com­
munication model. Strauss's emphasis on prudence opened the way for 
the muted version of his ideas manifested in the current neoconservative 
alliance. Writing in the postwar United States, where liberalism was heg­
emonic and seemed to be the only bulwark against communism, he acted 
the part of a critical ally. However, adopting a tactic similar to Benoist 
on "democracy," he inverted the conventional meaning of liberalism, dis­
tinguishing "ancient liberalism," or the above-mentioned aristocratic re­
gime that he esteemed from "modern liberalism," which he attacked vo­
ciferously. His favorable references to liberalism moderate his outward 
tone and fend off charges of extremism. Although formally defending the 
"liberal" tradition against communism and fascism, he reappropriated 
antiliberal aspects of early Western thought and transfigured liberalism 
into aristocratic elitism. Rather than conservative revolution, he implied 
a constitutional regime where political "truths" would be safe from chal­
lenge and popular sovereignty or "consent" would be minimal. The Straus-
sian regime stresses strict subordination of the individual to a rigid po­
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litical hierarchy. In a crisis of neoliberalism, his ideas could come to justify 
the ascendence of the more austere paleoconservative type of r egime that 
he implied normatively. Overall, Strauss offers theoretical resources for 
sharp critiques of neoliberalism and postmodernism and poses a radical 
alternative to modern theory and modern democracy. 
An End of Liberalism? 
Although leading carrier strata and ascendent groups have not yet 
emerged on the neopopulist right, Hans-George Betz argues that these 
movements diverge from postwar populism and are reminiscent of Wei­
mar-era politics (i.e., because of their global spread, anticapitalist critiques 
of economic restructuring, and appeal to disenchanted followers from 
divergent strata). He holds that neopopulism manifests a decomposing 
postwar political framework: "a dramatic increase in anxieties, insecurity, 
and pessimism about the future"; "postmodern" rejection of beliefs in "a 
future ideal society" and big "ideological projects"; shift from "organized" 
to "individualized capitalism"; and decline of left and right "cleavage 
politics" (Betz 1994, pp. 1-4, 23, 26-27, 34-35, 107, 141-68, 174-80; Betz 
1998, p. 7; B etz and Immerfall 1998; Barber 1996, pp. 155-300). 
In the 1980s, right-wing populist parties broadened their political bases 
among disenchanted strata, often shifting from neoliberal attacks on the 
welfare state to authoritarian racial, anti-immigrant, law-and-order agen­
das. This strategy helped increase their memberships, win some political 
offices, and push mainstream parties rightward. Although still marginal, 
some analysts predict that continued neoliberal globalization and further 
erosion of the left-right polarity will result in further expansion of these 
parties (Betz 1994, pp. 34-35, 189; 1998, p. 1; Immerfall 1998). Other 
thinkers make similar predictions about the New Right. Eatwell holds 
that these intellectual circles and consequent "partial rehabilitation of 
fascism" among elites opens the way for wider diffusion of neofascist ideas 
among the general public (Betz implies that right-wing populist parties 
are already more receptive to such ideas). Eatwell warns that the New 
Right is likely to gain much more political momentum in an "economic 
downturn," especially because the current centrist strategies of main­
stream parties have raised expectations that neoliberal policies will ulti­
mately improve labor markets and save welfare benefits. He fears that 
current signs indicate that significant facets of fascism will regain public 
support within 20 years (Eatwell 1997, pp. 352, 355, 361). Parsons and 
many other postwar modernization theorists saw free market capitalism 
and Social Darwinism to be moribund ideologies in the 1960s, but 1970s 
economic problems conjured them up from the grave. A periodical event 
since the origin of capitalism, market crises often take positions to the 
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center of debate and struggle that did not recently hold sway. In a global 
economic crisis, the "opportunity society" could appear to be as exhausted 
as Keynesianism and planning did in the later 1970s and 1980s. The cry 
for political intervention would likely stimulate new theories on the left 
as well as the right. Under these conditions, the New Right and paleo-
conservative approaches discussed above might be taken up by histori­
cally important carrier strata and groups and, thus, enter public life. The 
recent electoral success of Jorg Haider's "Freedom Party" (i.e., over 27% 
of the Austrian vote and a second-place finish) and its role in a new 
coalition government makes this scenario more plausible. 
Divergent theorists, who pose an "end to history," an "end of left and 
right," and an "end of a lternatives," suggest more than a failure of the­
oretical imagination. In particular, pessimistic theorists argue that the 
cultural bases and legitimacy of modern democratic ideals have been 
weakened or eroded. The New Right reshapes radical perspectivism and 
tribal tendencies into a monocultural critique of modernity; the forbidden 
aestheticized politics of ethnos are reshaped seductively to fit culturally 
postmodernized conditions. However, the memory of fascism, decades of 
immigration and hybridization, and vastly increased global socioeconomic 
interdependence make it highly unlikely that revived neofascism could 
repeat past history. Yet radical conservative ideas could harden the anti­
democratic tendencies already present in today's economically polarized, 
racialized, and complexly gated social world. Some thinkers hold that the 
cinema's dystopian scenarios of postmodern apocalypse are thinly sub­
limated accounts of existing tendencies, offering a sharper projection of 
the fearful "revival of the political" than I have discussed above. They 
imply that Weber's garrison state looms quietly in our new-built envi­
ronments, spatial politics, and security systems as well as in the noisier 
and bloodier tribal struggles of more distant lands (Davis 1992; Barber 
1996). 
My aim, however, is not a predictive one; I wish instead to illustrate 
a nascent theoretical alternative to postwar modernization theories and 
to positions that followed in their tracks. I have argued that neoliberalism 
and postmodernism were responses to an eroding postwar economic, po­
litical, and sociocultural complex and to failed beliefs in modernization. 
However, the postwar era ended sometime between the mid-1970s start 
of neoliberal restructuring and the revolutions of 1989. Now entwined 
with dominant political-economic and sociocultural forces, neoliberalism 
and postmodernism can hardly be seen as "alternatives." The radical 
conservative and paleoconservative tendencies suggest a possible shift that 
should provoke reflexive modern and postmodernist theorists to re-engage 
the issue of the foundations of liberalism and democracy and the role of 
"social theory" in this discourse. 
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TOTAL CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY, OR A RETURN TO SOCIAL 
THEORY? 
Ironically, for all his criticisms of Nietzsche, Heidegger's own 
position remains eminently "Nietzschean" in at least one crucial 
respect: he accepts without question the standpoint of "total 
critique. . . Thus, for both thinkers the essence of modernity 
is faithfully captured by the category of "nihilism": a wholesale 
dissolution of the structures of value and belief that have tra­
ditionally made life meaningful. The method of "immanent 
critique" is rejected insofar as there is . . . nothing about mo­
dernity as a social formation . . . worth redeeming." (VVolin 
1990, p. 166) 
The view of the future animating Heidegger's prototypical radical con­
servative "total critique" is not prefigured in modern culture and relies 
on a philosophical and aesthetic vision that urges radical rupture and de 
novo creation of a completely new postliberal or postmodern order. Re­
jecting such sweeping ideas of cultural exhaustion, "immanent" or "in­
ternal" critiques depart from facets of e xisting or emergent social condi­
tions. For example, Mannheim spoke of critique being anchored in a 
"living principle" or "ideas and values" that express "in condensed form 
the unrealized and . . . unfulfilled tendencies which represent the needs 
of each age" and that exist in a "dialectical" relation with dominant "ide­
ologies" ([1936] 1955, p. 199). This historicist type of c ritique makes nor­
mative points by sociological arguments, which welcome counterclaims. 
It is the domain of "social theory." 
Even Nietzsche did not break entirely with modernity. He embraced 
certain modern cultural resources, expressing high hopes about a more 
creative, authentic, freer future prefigured in late modernity's cultural 
diversity and autonomous individuality. Shedding these historicist threads 
in Nietzsche's otherwise highly pessimistic view of modernity, radical 
conservatives radicalized his total critique. Ignoring his vituperations 
about nationalism and regimentation, they advocated collective subjec­
tivity, aestheticized politics, and militarized culture, which promised to 
absorb the individual into the mass. Their one-sided "Nietzscheanism" 
substituted insular cultural totalities and mythologized ethnos for his "sov­
ereign individual" and hybrid "good European" (Antonio 1995, 2001). 
Radical conservatives blended their one-sided Nietzschean views with 
a one-sided, deeply pessimistic appropriation from Weber that transmuted 
rationalization into homogenization.30 Universalizing Weber's "iron cage" 
301 am not implying that all radical conservatives engaged Weber's texts closely. As 
with Nietzsche, much of his influence was indirect and based on generalized ideas 
about his thought ("in the air" of the Weimar era political and intellectual culture; see, 
e.g., Hughes 1977, pp. 34-35, 278-335, 372-78). 
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thesis, they dropped his qualifications about rationalization's historical 
ambiguities and divergent directions as well as his views about the af­
firmative facets of bureaucracy vis-it-vis patrimonialism. They ignored 
his fundamental distinction between limited state power and total states 
and argument that, within democratic regimes, bureaucratic jurisdiction 
and monocratic decision making {i.e. the "rule of small number"), block 
revolutionary change but clarify responsibility and make reform possible. 
They also scuttled his argument that "distinctly modern" secularization 
and cultural rationalization multiply specialized spheres of value and life, 
rationalize them according to their distinct internal logics, and enhance 
capacities to detect and cope with difference. Neither did they embrace 
his nuanced, highly qualified affirmation of science, which treated it as 
a normative resource of modernity, nurturing "ethical responsibility" as 
well as an instrumental advance, serving prosaic interests. Radical con­
servatives treated rationalization as a singular, relentless, deterministic 
march of n ihilistic disenchantment, instrumentalization, and domination. 
Traces of this hyperpessimistic view appear in the 1920s writings of the 
Marxist Georg Luk&cs as well as in the era's radical conservative theorists, 
such as Spengler (1991), Heidegger, Schmitt. Rather than rationalization 
per se, Weber's nightmare "iron cage" was exactly the top-down cure for 
bourgeois ills suggested by Schmitt and his friends and by their extreme-
left counterparts. 
Providing an intellectual bridge between the far right and cultural left, 
this totalizing fusion of quasi-Nietzschean and quasi-Weberian theory is 
visible in convergent facets of radical conservatism's "technological civ­
ilization," the Frankfurt school's "one-dimensionality," the New Left's 
"technocracy," and postmodernism's "carceral" society.31 In particular, 
Heidegger had enormous influence on several generations of social and 
political philosophers (e.g., Marcuse, Adorno, Arendt, Foucault; see, e.g., 
Safranski 1998). His reading of Nietzsche and radicalized total critique 
impacted on critical theory and was a major formative influence on post-
structuralism and postmodernism. Radical conservatism and radical 
cultural-left thought converge in total critiques, which treat modern de­
mocracy as so spent and false that alternatives are no longer foreshadowed 
in existing institutions and that the line with authoritarian regimes is 
blurred (e.g., Delfini and Piccone 1998, pp. 25-26, 40-41). Weber saw this 
type of total critique, which he traced "back to Nietzsche," as a leading 
tendency in the romantic antimodernism of the youth movement and left 
and right revolutionism of his day (Weber [1921] 19586, p. 393). He warned 
31 On convergence between left and right Nietzscheanism, see, e.g., Thomas (1986), 
Habermas (1987a, 1989, 1990), Taylor (1991), Wolin (1990, 1996), Aschheim (1992), 
Ferry and Renaut (1997), and Taguieff (1997). 
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that the consequent aesthetic radicalism countered the moderating ten­
dencies that he detected in the nascent scaled-down version of "science" 
and "ethic of responsibility," which he embraced normatively. Weber at­
tacked orthodox Marxism's and libertarianism's pseudohistoricist evo­
lutionary warranties about a sunny modern future as vehemently as the 
new forms of irrationalism. He saw these seemingly opposed tendencies 
to contradict inquiry and the discursive basis of legitimate order under 
conditions of disenchantment and cultural pluralism (Weber [1904] 1949a; 
[1917] 19496). The reenchanted authoritarian world that he feared was 
on the horizon came into being about decade after his death. We still live 
in its wake. 
Expressing fears about today's revived "Nietzschean" sensibilities, Luc 
Ferry and Alain Renaut contend that radical postructuralists, borrowing 
heavily from Heidegger, executed a "total critique of t he modern world" 
that treats "the democratic project" as an "ideology" or "illusion" and 
leaves "no place for an internal critique" (Ferry and Renaut 1990, p. xvi; 
Ferry 1994). 
An entire current of our recent intellectual life thought it had learned from 
Nietzsche that one could not escape from the dissatisfaction of modernity 
without rejecting the logic of argumentative rationality in which modern 
consciousness, breaking with the traditional universe has chosen to situate 
itself. It has thus been possible to believe that opening the way for a post-
modernity meant above all ferreting out differences and their richness from 
the leveling tyranny of identity. . . . Our philosophical generation is that 
which can no longer forget that the hatred of argumentation means prin­
cipally a return to authority. (Ferry and Renaut 1997, p. 106; emphasis in 
original)" 
Reminiscent of M annheim, Ferry and Renaut embrace "internal criti­
cism" or "analyzing . . . societies in the name of their own principles, in 
the name of promises, which they make and do not keep." Implying 
entwinement of historicism and the communication model, they hold that, 
to avert reliance on regimentation or force, normative debates must be 
animated by standpoints that, at least, prospectively, amplify determinate 
historical prospects nestled in existing or emergent sociocultural condi­
tions. Ferry (1994, p. 8) states "by contrast to the dazzling mythical hope 
of a movement beyond the real world," internal criticism offers an "un­
32 Ferry and Renaut add: "When we do not make a distinction between the public 
sphere of argumentation and media sphere of performance, when we denounce the 
first because of the defects of the second, we open the way to a method of managing 
conflicts that risks leaving but one procedure to arrive at their resolution: that of lining 
up divisions on both sides" (1997, p. 106; also see Ferry and Renault 1990, 1997, pp. 
92-95; Habermas 1990; Rorty 1998). 
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limited space for reflection and action." It focuses on arguments about 
sociocultural reality, which by contrast to apodictic intuition, are uncertain 
and plural, and, by contrast to aesthetic vision, are more than a matter 
of taste and call for inquiry and evidence. For these reasons, internal 
critique facilitates discursive exchange rather than assertion. It turns to 
"social theory," and advances the partial historicization begun by Marx 
and diverse theorists following in his tracks. 
Postmodernists and radical conservatives treat Marx as the master the­
orist of misguided faith in modernization. Overweening optimism about 
modernity exists in his work, especially in the prominent theme that social 
resources accumulate geometrically with advanced capitalist rationali­
zation and open the way for human emancipation. In particular, he saw 
modern science as a fundamental resource, animating material and social 
progress and lifting reflexivity and collective agency to heights that will 
one day end all prior history. However, Marx also attempted to make 
Hegel's pathbreaking historicism more specific and "social." He intended 
his materialism to follow history's tracks, to detect its actual structural 
features and contradictions, to expand its possibilities for reducing un­
necessary suffering, and to make human agency more intelligent. His 
immanent critique called for sociological inquiry and argument, rather 
than transcendental or decisionistic approaches. Although problematic 
and incomplete, Marx's historicization arguably can be seen as the start 
of modern social theory. Later "critical theorists," embracing his method, 
call for continual historical reassessment of theory and criticize the ahis-
torical facets of his work as he did with Hegel's thought (e.g., Benhabib 
1986; Antonio 1981, 1989, 1990). 
The uneven historicization in Marx's social theory arises from a tension 
between his "pseudohistoricism," which provides evolutionary guarantees 
about the future that suspend the need for inquiry and debate and, thus, 
retain affinity for earlier absolutism, and his "radical historicism," which 
opens normative claims to inquiry and discussion on the basis of their 
sociocultural consequences. The pseudohistorical side of Marx's work 
appears in his claims about capitalism's "iron laws," inevitable proletarian 
revolution and emancipation, and his certainty about his materialist sci­
ence. By contrast, his radical historicism is visible in his empirical inquiries 
about capitalism, analyses of class fragmentation and subclass conflicts, 
and his uncertainty about his own crisis theory.33 Marx's contradictory 
33 Engels's ([1890a] 1959a, pp. 396; [18906] 19596, pp. 399-400) letters to Conrad 
Schmidt and Joseph Bloch indicate that Marx and Engels were aware of the contrasting 
historicist themes in their work. Engels argued that Marx and he embraced the more 
radical form of historicism. However, he admitted that they sometimes spoke too 
deterministically and were "partly to blame" for new forms of "Marxism" (i.e., "amazing 
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historicism manifests a still ongoing and, perhaps, enduring "transition" 
between phases of Enlightenment—from monistic civil religion to plural 
social theories. The disenchantment of modernity, especially of its nor­
mative content, has proceeded much more slowly and unevenly than Marx 
or the philosophes could ever have imagined. Referring to Nietzsche and 
Tolstoy, Weber's rumination about the "vocation" of science, its tendency 
to make death "meaningless," and antimodern reaction provides eloquent 
testimony to an inbetween age ([1918] 1958a). Reactionary tribalism re­
flects the mean side of the ambivalence about secular life in a time when 
the shadows of previous enchantment still dance on the wall. 
From diverse points of view, other first-generation modern theorists 
also posed normative standpoints that claimed to reflect the progressive 
side of modernization—although sometimes much less assertively and in 
more roundabout ways than Marx did. Framed before the rise of spe­
cialized science and the world wars, these theorists had a strong faith in 
science and modernity, especially in the promise of increased reflexivity 
and rational agency and, consequently, greatly expanded capacities for 
enlightened sociopolitical intervention. After some tempering of meteoric 
hopes, resurgent, post-World War II era "grand theories" expressed fresh 
versions of evolutionary historicism, which had earlier plagued Marx. 
Optimism was so high about progressive modernization and social sci­
ence's prominent role in the process that many empirically oriented the­
orists implied that there was no need for social theory. They heralded the 
dawning of a postideological age where consensus about liberal demo­
cratic values and institutions reduced debates over social problems to 
technical matters of implementation. Although applauding efforts to mine 
earlier modern theories for research problems, concepts, and hypotheses, 
they saw first-generation approaches as prescientific speculative frame­
works, too normative and too broad to be "tested." Viewing social theory 
as something to be surpassed, they celebrated its decline and replacement 
by "sociological theory" as a sign of d isciplinary modernization and pro­
gress (e.g., Catton 1966; Homans 1967; Merton 1967; see Ross 1991). 
Commenting on postwar U.S. sociology, Raymond Aron lamented the 
equation of the decline of "major doctrines," "grand syntheses," and "global 
historical interpretations of the modern age" with "scientific maturity" 
([1967] 1989, pp. v-ix, 331-32). From left and right, C. Wright Mills (1961) 
and Robert Nisbet (1966) had similar regrets. Levine (1995, pp. 315-16) 
makes the same point today, holding that social theory's core problem of 
"coming to grips with the character of the modern order" is regrettably 
eschewed and even erased from the social science curriculum. 
rubbish") that use materialism "as an excuse for not studying history" and as a "lever 
for construction after the manner of a Hegelian." 
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Postmodernists charge that modern theory's quasi-evolutionary war­
ranties about sociocultural progress, whether directly in the form of grand 
theory or tacitly as "value-free" scientism, merely dress absolutism in 
scientific garb and, thus, undermine dialogue about modernity's conflic-
tive values, crisis tendencies, and repressive features. They hold that mod­
ern theory has been rife with particularist biases (e.g., racial, ethnic, re­
ligious, gender, colonial blindspots) and has failed to follow through in 
practice on the ethical universalism or ethical neutrality that it endorses 
in the abstract. They claim that it often "totalizes" hegemonic cultural 
views, helping repress difference and harden domination. Although these 
critiques are sometimes exaggerated, they point to genuine problems in 
the modern tradition. As I have argued above, "reflexive" modern theorists 
converge with reflexive postmodernists. Their attacks on pseudohistorical 
progressivism, scientism, and totalized theory do not entail a rejection of 
historicism or social theory in toto. Rather they scale down and historicize 
modern theory's normative claims, carrying on the critical side of En­
lightenment thought. Modern theory is best grasped in a "postmodern" 
way, recognizing its ambiguous, discordant facets. However, identifying 
its blindspots and flaws ought to animate reconstruction rather than 
dismissal. 
The total critique by the politicized version of strong-program post­
modernism executes a sharp, albeit, incomplete break with modern theory, 
leaving its self-proclaimed hope for cultural transformation hanging with­
out sociological bases. Putting aside Schmitt's normative affirmation of 
friend-enemy thinking, his theory offers insights into left tribalism. Suf­
fusing its combative particularism, friend-enemy distinctions contradict 
its espoused ideals, foster political correctness, and undermine its hoped-
for alliance politics. Although formally embracing multiculturalism, es-
sentialized identity politics and standpoint philosophy break with the 
communication model upon which such cultural pluralism relies. Aban­
doning the historicist emphasis on the "factual" or consequential side of 
normative discourses, strong-program textualism lacks the constraint pro­
vided by systematic "sociological" inquiry about obdurate "realities." The 
resulting radical relativist position points limply to the social location of 
favored points of view, but it lacks pragmatic bases to justify their ranking 
over competing perspectives. Although advocating multisided plural "dis­
courses," this strategy merely asserts normative standpoints and, thus, 
tends toward monologue. Its implicit reliance on authority paves the way 
for more extreme antiuniversalism, perspectivism, and culturalism. The 
radical conservative total critique overturns much more radically and 
consistently the sociological presuppositions of modern theory and of 
sociopolitical orders based on demos. Promising reenchantment and tran­
scendence of nihilism, reactionary tribalism offers antidemocratic alter­
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natives to postmodernism's fractious heterotopia as well as to neoliber-
alism's global market and to social democracy's withered modernization 
project. 
First-generation modern theories expressed an ethical dimension that 
amplified science's differentiation from politics and religion and that was 
narrated in reference to exemplary events, struggles, and people (i.e., the 
trial of Galileo). This motif also was manifested in beliefs about "truth 
seeking," which seem quaint and naive by today's constructivist stan­
dards, but which motivated theorists such as Marx, Weber, and Mead to 
struggle tirelessly with "problematics" and leave behind reams of unpub­
lished work. Nietzsche saw this scientific "will to truth" as the secularized 
root of Judeo-Christian culture, and, despite his doubts, conceded its "in­
tegrity" in late modernity. During the postwar era, this ethical side of 
science was sublimated into an optimistic halo around economic growth 
and technocracy, and, after modernization theory crashed, it was seen as 
a complete fabrication by ascendent postmodernism. Assurances about 
progressive modernity and science lack force when such faith has dimmed 
nearly everywhere beyond disciplinary inner circles and in light of the 
antimodern challenges to democratic culture. But given today's caco­
phonous value splits and internecine tribal warfare, purely deconstructive 
strategies and radical relativism hardly seem "critical." Realism about 
science's ambiguous meanings, divergent impacts, and limits should not 
rule out efforts to reappropriate its ethical side or to entertain its potential 
resources for public life. Rethinking social theory as a normative language 
and mediator between science and plural, segmented publics is a project 
worth pursuing in today's climate. 
First-generation modern theory arose from a broader cultural shift from 
absolutist standpoints based on theological and metaphysical presuppo­
sitions to historicist normative arguments. Social theory is no substitute 
for specialized knowledge or empirical work, but it provides a means to 
discuss science's purposes, directions, and role—normative issues that are 
beyond the purview of science per se. By contrast to sociological theory's 
largely empirical, hermeneutic, or analytical intent and middle-range dis­
ciplinary focus, social theory has a strong normative thrust. It poses broad 
questions about the "value" of d ifferent directions of sociocultural devel­
opment, knowledge, and policy. The line with philosophy is often am­
biguous, but social theory is a historicist alternative to religious or meta­
physical absolutism and to transcendental or deontological theories. It has 
philosophical presuppositions, but it debates normative matters primarily 
on the basis of existent, nascent, or possible sociocultural conditions and, 
thus, draws on social-scientific theories, concepts, and research. Social 
theory also differs from more narrowly bounded and often ahistorical 
normative political theory. In a disenchanted age with diverse groups and 
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values, social theory operates most effectively in pluralistic discursive 
fields of competing approaches, which parallel the diversity of civil society 
and provide nondogmatic, yet systematic means to address sociocultural 
differences. Social theories offer sociological "good reasons" for securing, 
reforming, or changing a sociocultural regime, and are, in principle, open 
to inquiry and challenge (i.e., debates center on its fit to sociocultural 
conditions and, especially, on its consequences for collective life). In my 
view, social theory is a distinctly modern practice that began with the 
first-generation modern theorists and is entwined with the rise of social 
science. As Weber implied, new social theories emerge in times of "rup­
ture," when specialized knowledge and practices are crisis ridden and 
must be rethought to fit new conditions, but they also offer means to 
discuss and debate alternative directions of science and policy in good 
times as well as bad. Social theory cannot replace sociological theory or 
science, but it is a means for reflecting on their relation to public life. 
Although boundaries are porous, conflation of social theory and socio­
logical theory distorts social knowledge. Treating social theory as a specific 
practice would reduce the tendency of normative theorists and empirical 
theorists to "speak past each other" (e.g., automatic dismissals of social 
theory for being "too broad," "too distant from testable problems," or "too 
philosophical" or, conversely, of specialized sociological work for being 
"too narrow," "too quantitative," or "too technical"). Pitting the two types 
of theory against each other amplify confusion about their role, meaning, 
uses, and limits. 
We have moved only very haltingly toward the "secular ethic" and 
"dialogical" approach embraced by Levine. That we have not gotten very 
far appears in the rampant conflation of normative and empirical issues 
and of social theory with sociological theory. A residue of e arly modern 
theory, the lingering "faith" among specialists about the inherent cultural 
significance of their work and about social science's role as the beacon 
of late-modernity's reflexive agency looms over the postmodern cultural 
landscape—the specter of progress at the end of history. Both Nietzsche 
and Weber held that normative questions about "how we should live" or 
"what is worth knowing" cannot be answered by science, but are essential 
to reflexivity about its practices. The rampant endings' discourses and 
new total critiques reflect an exhaustion of theoretical imagination as 
much as social gridlock. However, the recent stirring of thought about 
modernity and postmodernity could mark the type of moment that Weber 
argued would cause us to look down from the "heights of thought" and 
rethink the "meaning" of our practices. Social theory and the communi­
cation model offer a via media against the rising tides of relativism and 
absolutism (e.g., Kloppenberg 1986; Kent 2000). John Dewey's point on 
the eve of the Depression still holds: "The need for large and generous 
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ideas in the direction of li fe was never more urgent than in the confusion 
of tongues, beliefs, and purposes that characterizes present life" ([1929] 
19886, p. 248). 
REFERENCES 
Anderson, Perry. 1998a. "A Reply to Bobbio." New Left Review 231:91-93. 
—•. 19986. "A S ense of the Left." New Left Review 231:73-81. 
Antonio, Robert J. 1981. "Immanent Critique as the Core of Critical Theory: Its Origins 
and Developments in Hegel, Marx and Contemporary Thought." British Journal of 
Sociology 32:330-45. 
. 1989. "The Normative Foundations of Emancipatory Theory: Evolutionary 
versus Pragmatic Perspectives." American Journal of Sociology 94:721-48. 
— . 1990. "The Decline of the Grand Narrative of Emancipatory Modernity: Crisis 
or Renewal in Neo-Marxian Theory?" Pp. 88-116 in Frontiers of Social Theory: 
The New Syntheses, edited by George Ritzer. New York: Columbia University Press. 
. 1991. "Postmodern Storytelling versus Pragmatic Thrth-Seeking: The 
Discursive Bases of Social Theory." Sociological Theory 9:154-63. 
-— . 19 95. "Nietzsche's Antisociologv: Subjectified Culture and the End of History." 
American Journal of Sociology 101:1-43. 
—. 1998. "Mapping Postmodern Social Theory." Pp. 22-75 in What Is Social 
Theory? The Philosophical Debates, edited by Alan Sica. Oxford: Blackwell. 
— . 2001. "Nietzsche: Social Theory in the Twilight of the Millennium." In The 
Handbook of Social Theory, edited by George Ritzer and Barry Smart. London: 
Sage, in press. 
Antonio, Robert J., and Alessandro Bonanno. 1996. "Post-Fordism in the United States: 
The Poverty of Market-Centered Democracy." Current Perspectives in Social Theory 
16:3-32. 
Antonio, Robert J., and Douglas Kellner. 1992a. "Communication, Modernity, and 
Democracy in Habermas and Dewey." Symbolic Interaction 15:277-97. 
. 19926. "Metatheorizing Historical Rupture: Classical Theory and Modernity." 
Pp. 88-106 in Metatheorizing, edited by George Ritzer. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage. 
Appiah, K. Anthony, and Amy Guttman. 1996. Color Conscious: The Political Morality 
of Race. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Aron, Raymond. (1967) 1989. Main Currents in Sociological Thought, vol. 2. Translated 
by Richard Howard and Helen Weaver. New York: Anchor Books. 
Aschheim, Steven E. 1992. The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, 1890-1990. Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Ashley, David. 1997. History without a Subject: The Postmodern Condition. Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview Press. 
Barber, Benjamin R. 1996. Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalistn and Tribalism Are 
Reshaping the World. New York: Ballantine Books. 
Baudrillard, Jean. 1983a. In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities or, The End of the 
Social and Other Essays, translated by Paul Foss, John Johnston, and Paul Patton. 
New York: Semiotextfe). 
. 19836. Simulations, translated by Paul Foss, Paul Patton, and Phillip 
Beitchman. New York: Semiotext(e). 
— . 1990. Fatal Strategies, edited by Jim Fleming. Translated by Philip Beitchman 
and W. G. J. Niezluchowsky. New York and London: Semiotext(e)/Pluto. 
Bauman, Zygmunt 1992. Intimations of Postmodernity. New York: Routledge. 
—. 1993. Postmodern Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Beck, Ulrich. 1992a. "From Industrial Society to the Risk Society: Questions of 
79 
American Journal of Sociology 
Survival, Social Structure and Ecological Enlightenment." Theory, Culture and 
Society 9 (1): 97-123. 
. 19926. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, translated by Mark Ritter. 
Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage. 
. 1994. "The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive 
Modernization." Pp. 1-55 in Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and 
Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order, edited by Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, 
and Scott Lasch. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 
-— . 1996. "World Risk Society as Cosmopolitan Society? Ecological Questions in 
a Framework of Manufactured Uncertainties." Theory, Culture and Society 13 (4): 
1-32. 
. 1997. The Reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social 
Order, translated by Mark Ritter. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Beck, Ulrich, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash. 1994. Reflexive Modernization: 
Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press. 
Bell, Daniel. 1990. "Resolving the Contradictions of Modernity and Modernism." 
Society 27 (March/April): 43-50. 
. 1996. The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, rev. ed. New York: Basic 
Books. 
Bell, Daniel A. 1995. Communitarianism and Its Critics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Bellah, Robert N., Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven 
M. Tipton. 1986. Habits of the Heart; Individualism and Commitment in American 
Life. New York: Perennial Library. 
Bendersky, Joseph. W. 1987, "Carl Schmitt and the Conservative Revolution." Telos 
72:27-42. 
Benhabib, Seyla. 1986. Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study in the Foundations of 
Critical Theory. New York: Columbia University Press. 
, ed. 1996. Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Benhabib, Seyla, and Fred Dallmayr, eds. 1990. The Communicative Ethics 
Controversy. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Bennett, David H. 1995. The Party of Fear: From Nativist Movements to the New 
Right in American History. New York: Vintage Books. 
Benoist, Alain de. 1991. "Democracy: Ancient and Modern." Conservative Review 2 
(6): 26-30. 
. 1993-94a. "The Idea of Empire." Telos 98/99:81-98. 
—-—. 1993-946. "Three Interviews with Alain de Benoist." Telos 98/99:173-207. 
— -. 19 95. "End of the Left-Right Dichotomy: The French Case." Telos 102:73-89. 
— . 1996a. "Confronting Globalization." Telos 108:117-37. 
. 19966. Europe, Tiers monde meme combat. Laffont: Paris. 
-. 1997. "The Time of the Nets" (in Italian). Diorama Letterario, no. 208 
(http://www.diorama.it). 
. 1998a. "Hayek: A Critique." Telos 110:71-104. 
. 19986. "Between the Gods and the Titans," pt. 1. The Scorpion, issue 15. 
. 1998c. "Between the Gods and the Titans," pt. 2. The Scorpion, issue 17. 
. 1999. "What Is Racism?" Telos 114:11-48. 
Best, Steven, and Douglas Kellner. 1991. Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations. 
London: Macmillan. 
Betz, Hans-George. 1994. Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. New York: 
St. Martin's Press. 
. 1998. Introduction to The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and 
Movements in Established Democracies, edited by Hans George Betz and Stefan 
Immerfall. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
80 
After Postmodernism 
Betz, Hans-George, and Stefan Immerfall, eds. 1998. The New Politics of the Right: 
Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies. New York: St. 
Martin's Press. 
Bloom, Allan David. 1987. The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education 
Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students. New York: 
Simon & Sc huster. 
—-. 1989. "Responses to Fukuyama [Bloom's section]." National Interest 16:19-21. 
Bobbio, Norberto. 1996. Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction, 
translated by Allan Cameron. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
. 1998. "At the Beginning of History." New Left Review 231:82-90. 
Boyer, Robert. 1998. "The Pyrrhic Victory of Anglo-Saxon Capitalism." Thesis Eleven 
53:93-101. 
Boynton, Robert S. 1997. "The Two Tonys." New Yorker October 6:66-74. 
Boyte, Harry C., and Frank Riessman, eds. 1986. The New Populism: The Politics of 
Empowerment. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Braun, Denny. 1997. The Rich Get Richer: The Rise of Income Inequality in the United 
States and the World, 2d ed. Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers. 
Brenner, Robert. 1998. Special issue, "The Economics of Global TUrbulence: A Special 
Report on the World Economy, 1950-98." New Left Review, vol. 229. 
Brohman, John. 1996. Popular Development: Rethinking the Theory and Practice of 
Development. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Buchanan, Patrick J. 1998. The Great Betrayal: How American Sovereignty and Social 
Justice Are Being Sacrificed to the Gods of the Global Economy. Boston: Little 
Brown. 
Butler, Judith. 1998. "Merely Cultural." New Left Review 227:33-44. 
Castells, Manuel. 1996. The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture: The Rise 
of Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell. 
. 1997. The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture: The Power of 
Identity. Oxford: Blackwell. 
. 1998. The Information Age: Economy, Society and.Culture: End of Millennium. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Catton, William B. 1966. From Animistic to Naturalistic Sociology. New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Charnot, Paul. 1998. "Eclectics in Perspective." The Scorpion, issue 17. 
Coppola, Vincent. 1996. Dragons of God: A Journey through Far-Right America. 
Marietta, Ga.: Longstreet Press. 
Dahl, Goran. 1996. "Will 'the Other God' Fail Again? On the Possible Return of the 
Conservative Revolution." Theory, Culture, and Society 13 (1): 25-50. 
1999. Radical Conservatism and the Future of Politics. London and Thousand 
Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publishers. 
Davis, Mike. 1992. City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles. New York: 
Vintage Books. 
Delfini, Alex, and Paul Piccone. 1998. "Modernity, Libertarianism and Critical Theory: 
Reply to Pellicani." Telos 112:23—16. 
Dewey, John. (1938) 1986. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. Vol. 12 of John Dewey, The 
Later Works, 1925-1953, edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale and Edwardsville: 
Southern Illinois University Press. 
. (1925) 1988a. Experience and Nature. Vol. 1 of John Dewey: The Later Works, 
1925-1953, edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern 
Illinois University Press. 
. (1929) 1988b. The Quest for Certainty. Vol. 4 of John Dewey: The Later Works, 
1925-1953, edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern 
Illinois University Press. 
81 
American Journal of Sociology 
Dickens, R. David, and Andrea Fontana, eds, 1994. Postmodernism and Social Inquiry, 
New York: Guilford Press. 
Drury, Shadia B. 1997. Leo Strauss and the American Right. New York: St. Martin's 
Press. 
Eagleton, Terry. 1996. The Illusions of Postmodernism. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Eatwell, Roger. 1997. Fascism: A History. New York: Penguin Books. 
The Economist. 1998, "Beyond Left and Right." May 2-8, pp. S2-S3. 
Engels, Frederick. (1890a) 1959a. "Engels to Conrad Schmidt." Pp. 395-97 in Marx 
and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, edited by Lewis S. Feuer. 
Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books. 
. (18906) 19596. "Engels to Joseph Bloch." Pp. 397-400 in Marx and Engels: 
Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, edited by Lewis S. Feuer. Garden City, 
N.Y.: Anchor Books. 
Etzioni, Amitai, ed. 1995. Rights and the Common Good: The Communitarian 
Perspective. New York: Saint Martin's Press. 
Feher, Ferenc. 1995. "1989 and the Deconstruction of Political Monism." Thesis Eleven 
42:87-112. 
Ferry, Luc. 1994. "The Three Phases of Modern Philosophy: Tasks for a Secularized 
Thought." Thesis Eleven 37:1-9. 
Ferry, Luc, and Alain Renaut. 1990. French Philosophy of the Sixties: An Essay on 
Antihumanism, translated by Mary H. S. Cattani. Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press. 
— . 1997. "What Must First Be Proved Is Worth Little." Pp. 92-109 in Why We 
Are Not Nietzscheans, edited by Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut. Translated by Robert 
de Loaiza. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Francis, Samuel. 1993. Beautiful Losers: Essays on the Failure of American 
Conservatism. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 
Frankel, Boris. 1997. "Confronting Neoliberal Regimes: The Post-Marxist Embrace of 
Populism and Realpolitik." New Left Review 226:57-92. 
Fraser, Nancy. 1995. "From Redistribution to Recognition, Dilemmas of Justice in a 
'Post-Socialist' Age." New Left Review 212:68-93. 
—. 1997 .Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the "Postsocialist" Condition. 
Routledge: New York. 
. 1998. "Heterosexism, Misrecognition and Capitalism: A Response to Judith 
Butler." New Left Review 228:140-49. 
Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. "The End of History?" National Interest 16:3-18. 
. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. London: Penguin Books. 
. 1999. "Second Thoughts: The Last Man in a Bottle." National Interest 56: 
16-33. 
Giddens, Anthony. 1991. Modernity and Self Identity: Self and Society in the Late 
Modern Age. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 
-. 1992. The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in 
Modern Societies. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 
_——. 1994a. Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics. Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press. 
. 19946. "Living in a Post-Ttaditional Society." Pp. 56-109 in Reflexive 
Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order, edited 
by Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press. 
Gitlin, Todd. 1995. The Twilight of Common Dreams: Why America Is Wracked by 
Culture Wars. New York: Metropolitan Books. 
Gordon, David M. 1996. Fat and Mean: The Corporate Squeeze of Working Americans 
and the Myth of Managerial "Downsizing." New York: Free Press. 
Gottfried, Paul. 1990. Carl Schmitt: Politics and Theory. New York: Greenwood Press. 
82 
After Postmodernism 
. 1993. "Anatomy of an Apology [review of Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of 
Antiliberalism]." Telos, no. 97, pp. 155-64. 
. 1994. "After Liberalism." Telos, no. 101, pp. 169-72. 
-. 1995. "Reconfiguring the Political Landscape" Telos, no. 103, pp. 111-26. 
. 1996. "The Best of All Possible Worlds [Review of Max Singer and Aaron 
Wildavsky, The Real World Order]." Telos, no. 109, pp. 189-92. 
Greider, William. 1997, "Why the Global Economy Needs Worker Rights." Working 
USA May/June: 32-44. 
Gutmann, Amy, ed. 1994. Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. 
Princeton, N.JL: Prin ceton University Press. 
Habcrmas, Jurgen. 1984. The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society, vol. 1. Translated by Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon 
Press. 
. 1987a. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, translated 
by Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
. 19876. The Theory of Communicative Action: Lifcworld and System: A Critique 
of Functionalist Reason, vol. 2. Translated by Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon 
Press. 
. 1989. The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians Debate, 
edited and translated by Shierry Weber Nicholsen. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
. 1 990. "What Does Socialism Mean Today? The Rectifying Revolution and the 
Need for New Thinking on the Left." New Left Review 183:3-21. 
. 1993. "Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States." European Journal 
of Philosophy 1:128-55. 
. 1 996. Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 
and Democracy, translated by William Rehg. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
. 1998. "Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights." Philosophy and 
Social Criticism 24 (2/3): 157-71. 
Haraway, Donna. 1988. "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism 
and the Privilege of Partial Perspective." Feminist Studies 14:575-99. 
Harrison, Bennett. 1994. Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power 
in the Age of Flexibility. New York: Basic Books. 
Harrison, Bennett, and Barry Bluestone. 1988. The Great U-Turn: Corporate 
Restructuring and the Polarizing of America. New York: Basic Books. 
Harvey, David. 1989. The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins 
of Cultural Change. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell. 
Heidegger, Martin. (1953) 1961. An Introduction to Metaphysics, translated by Ralph 
Manheim. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books. 
Herf, Jeffrey. 1986. Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in 
Weimar and the Third Reich. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Hobsbawn, E. J. 1996. "Identity Politics and the Left." New Left Review 217:38—47. 
Homans, George C. 1967. The Nature of Social Science. New York: Harbinger Books. 
Hughes, H. Stuart. 1977. Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European 
Social Theory, 1890—1930. New York: Vintage Books. 
Hughey, Michael W., ed. 1998. New Tribalisms: The Resurgence of Race and Ethnicity. 
New York: New York University Press. 
Immerfall, Stefan. 1998. "The Neo-Populist Agenda." Pp. 249-61 in The New Politics 
of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies, 
edited by Hans George Betz and Immerfall. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Jameson, Fredric. 1984. "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism." 
New Left Review 146:53-92. 
. 1991. Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham, N.C.: 
Duke University Press. 
Jencks, Charles. 1986. Modern Movements in Architecture. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
83 
American Journal of Sociology 
Kalb, James. 1998. "The Amish, David Koresh, and a Newer World Order." The 
Scorpion, issue 19. 
Kalyvas, Andreas. 1999. "Review Essay: Who's Afraid of Carl Schmitt." Philosophy 
and Social Criticism 25 (5): 87-113. 
Kent, Robert. 2000. "John Dewey and the Project of Critical Social Theory." Social 
Thought and Research 23:1-58. 
Kloppenberg, James T. 1986. Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism 
in European and American Thought, 1870-1920. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Kolnai, Aurel. 1938. The War against the West. New York: Viking. 
Kumar, Krishan. 1995. From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society: New Theories 
of the Contemporary World. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Lambert, Laurence. 1996. Leo Strauss and Nietzsche. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Lasch, Christopher. 1995. The Revolt of the Masses and the Betrayal of Democracy. 
New York: Norton. 
Lee, Martin A. 1997. The Beast Reawakens. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Lefebvre, Henri. (1962) 1995. Introduction to Modernity: Twelve Preludes, September 
1959-May 1961, translated by John Moore. New York: Verso. 
Leinberger, Paul, and Bruce Tucker. 1991. The New Individualists: The Generation 
after the Organization Man. New York: HarperCollins. 
Lepenies, Wolf. 1988. Between Literature and Science: The Rise of Sociology, translated 
by R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Levine, Donald N. 1995. Visions of the Sociological Tradition. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
. 1997. "Social Theory as a Vocation: Engaging with Future Challenges." 
Perspectives: The 4S/4 Theory Section Newsletter 19:1-8. 
Lyotard, Jean-Francois. 1984. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, 
translated by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Maclntyre, Alasdair. 1988. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame, Ind.: 
University of Notre Dame Press. 
Maffesoli, Michel. 1996. The Time of the Tribes: The Decline of Individualism in Mass 
Society, translated by Don Smith. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage. 
Mannheim, Karl. (1936) 1955. Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology 
of Knowledge, translated by Louis Wirth and Edward Shills. New York: Harvest 
Books. 
Mansfield, Harvey, Jr. 1988. "Straussianism, Democracy, and Allan Bloom, II: 
Democracy and the Great Books." New Republic 198 (14): 33-37. 
Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. (1848) 1976. Manifesto of the Communist Party. 
Pp. 477-519 in Karl Marx Frederick Engels: Collected Works, 50 vols. Vol. 6, Marx 
and Engels: 1845-1848. New York: International Publishers. 
Meier, Heinrich. 1995. Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Mellucci, Alberto. 1996. Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Merton, R. 1967. On Theoretical Sociology: Five Essays, Old and New. New York: 
Free Press. 
Mills, C. Wright. 1961. The Sociological Imagination. New York: Grove Press. 
Mouffe, Chantal. 1993. The Return of the Political. London: Verso. 
Mulhall, Stephen, and Adam Swift. 1992. Liberals and Communitarians. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Nicholson, Linda. 1996. "To Be or Not to Be: Charles Taylor and the Politics of 
Recognition." Constellations 3 (1): 1-16. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. (1887) 1969. On the Genealogy of Morals, translated by Walter 
84 
After Postmodernism 
Kaufmann and R. J. Holiingdale, and (1888) Ecce Homo, translated by Walter 
Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books. 
Nisbet, Robert. 1966. The Sociological Tradition. New York: Basic Books. 
Offe, Claus. 1996. Modernity and the State: East, West. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Paretsky, Nick. 1996. "Support For Industrial Policy by the Council on Foreign 
Relations and Trilateral Commission: 1974-1984." Unpublished paper presented at 
the American Sociological Meetings, New York, August 16-20. 
Parsons, Talcott. 1971. The System of Modem Societies. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Pels, Dick. 1998. "Fascism and the Primacy of the Political." Telos 110:39-70. 
. 1990-91. "Artificial Negativity as a Bureaucratic Tool? Reply to Roe" Telos 
86:127-40. 
. 1995. "Postmodern Populism." Telos 103:45-86. 
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
. 1996. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Richardson, Laurel. 1991. "Postmodern Social Theory: Representational Practices." 
Sociological Theory 9:173-79. 
Rorty, Richard. 1988. "Straussianism, Democracy, and Allan Bloom, I. That Old-Time 
Philosophy." New Republic 198 (14): 28-33. 
. 1998. Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth Century America. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Ross, Dorothy. 1991. The Origins of American Social Science, New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Safranski, Rlidiger. 1998. Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, translated by 
Ewald Osers. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Sandel, Michael J. 1996. Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public 
Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press. 
. (1982) 1998. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2d ed. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. 1992. The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a 
Multicultural Society. New York: Norton. 
Schmitt, Carl. (1925) 1986. Political Romanticism, translated by Guy Oaks. Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press. 
. (1926) 1988. The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, translated by Ellen 
Kennedy. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
. (1932) 1996. The Concept of the Political, notes and translation by George 
Schwab [with Leo Strauss's notes on Schmitt's essay, translated by J. Harvey 
Lomax]. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Seidman, Steven. 1991a. "The End of Sociological Theory: The Postmodern Hope." 
Sociological Theory 9:131—46. 
. 19916. "Postmodern Anxiety: The Politics of Epistemology." Sociological 
Theory 9:180-90. 
. 1992. "Word Power: Is Rhetoric All There Is}" Sociological Theory 10:255-58. 
-——. 1996a. "The Political Unconscious of the Human Sciences." Sociological 
Quarterly 37:699-719. 
. 19966. "Pragmatism and Sociology: A Response to Clough, Denzin and 
Richardson." Sociological Quarterly 37:753-59. 
Selznick, Philip. 1992. The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of 
Community. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Smart, Barry. 1992. Modern Conditions, Postmodern Controversies. New York: 
Routledge. 
Spengler, Oswald. 1991. The Decline of the West, abridged edition by Helmut Werner, 
translated by Charles Francis Atkinson, and English abridged edition by Arthur 
Helps. New York: Oxford University Press. 
85 
American Journal of Sociology 
Stephens, Julie. 1998. Anti-Disciplinary Protest: Sixties Radicalism and 
Postmodernism. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Strauss Leo. (1950) 1965. Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
. (1952) 1980. Persecution and the Art of Writing. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
. 1989a. An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays by Leo Strauss, 
edited by Hilail Gildin. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. Press. 
. 19896. The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: An Introduction to the 
Thought of Leo Strauss (Essays and Lectures by Leo Strauss), selected by Thomas 
L. Pangle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
———. (1968) 1995. Liberalism Ancient and Modern. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
. (1932) 1996. "Notes on Carl Schmitt," translated by J. Harvey Lomax. Pp 
81-107 in The Concept of the Political, by Carl Schmitt. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Strong, Tracy B., ed. 1992. The Self and the Political Order. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Blackwell. 
Sunic, Tomislav. 1990. Against Democracy and Equality: The European New Right. 
New York: Peter Lang. 
Taguieff, Pierre-Andre. 1993-94a. "From Race to Culture: The New Right's Yiew of 
European Identity." Telos 98-99:99-125. 
—. 1993-946. "Origins and Metamorphoses of the New Right: An Interview with 
Pierre-Andre Taguief." Telos 98-99:159-72. 
—. 1997. "The Traditionalist Paradigm—Horror of Modernity and Neoliberalism: 
Nietzsche in Reactionary Rhetoric." Pp. 158-224 in Why We Are Not Nietzscheans, 
edited by Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut and translated by Robert De Loaiza. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Taylor, Charles. 1991. The Ethics of Authenticity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
Thomas, R. Hinton. 1986. Nietzsche in German Politics and Society 1890-1918. La 
Salle, 111.: Op en Court Press. 
Tbrner, Stephen. 1996. "Religious Pluralism, Toleration, and Liberal Democracy: Past, 
Present, and Future." Pp. 275-89 in Religion atid the Political Order: Politics in 
Classical and Contemporary Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, edited by Jacob 
Neusner. Tampa: University of South Florida Press. 
Walzer, Michael. 1997. On Toleration. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 
Weber, Max. (1904) 1949a. "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy." Pp. 
49-112 in The Methodology of the Social Sciences, translated and edited by Edward 
A. Shils and Henry A. Finch. New York: Free Press. 
. (1917) 19496. "The Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality' in Sociology and 
Economics." Pp. 1-47 in The Methodology of the Social Sciences, translated and 
edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch. New York: Free Press. 
-. (1918) 1958a. "Science as a Vocation." Pp. 129-56 From Max Weber: Essays 
in Sociology, edited and translated by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
. (1921) 19586. "National Character and the Junkers." Pp. 386-95 in Max Weber, 
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited and translated by H. H. Gerth and 
C. Wright Mills,. New York: Oxford University Press. 
. (1922-23) 1958c. "The Social Psychology of World Religions." Pp. 267-301 in 
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited and translated by H. H. Gerth and 
C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press. 
West, Cornel. 1989. The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism. 
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 
86 
After Postmodernism 
. 1993. Beyond Eurocentrism and Multiculturalism: Prophetic Thought in 
Postmodern Times, vol. 1: M onroe, Maine: Common Courage Press. 
Woltermann, Chris. 1993. "What Is Paleoconservatism?" Telos 97:9-31. 
Wood, Ellen Mciksins. 1986. The Retreat from Class: A New "True" Socialism. London: 
Verso. 
. 1995. Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Woods, Roger. 1996. The Conservative Revolution in the Weimar Republic. New York: 
St. Martin's Press. 
Wolin, Richard. 1990. The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
. 1992. "Carl Schmitt: The Conservative Revolutionary Habitus and the 
Aesthetics of Horror." Political Theory 20 (3): 424-47. 
. 1996. "Left Fascism: Georges Bataille and the German Ideology." 
Constellations 2:397-428. 
Zimmerman, Michael E. 1990. Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, 
Politics, and Art. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
lizek, Slavoj. 1997. "Multiculturalism, or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational 
Capitalism." New Left Review 225:28-51. 
87 
